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 PART ONE 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS 
  
  I had thought to entitle this presentation ‘On Beyond Conscience’.   
I decided not to because ‘On Beyond Conscience’ invites comparisons with 
particular ‘Beyond’ books--oh, for example, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL by 
Friedrich Nietzsche or BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY by B.F. Skinner or 
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD by Solnit and Freud. Actually 
there is only one ‘Beyond’ book with which I wish to invite comparison: ON 
BEYOND ZEBRA by Dr. Seuss. 
 Many children we have known either because we have been their parents 
or their therapists have derived great pleasure from ON BEYOND ZEBRA. 
Parents will readily recall that the premise of On Beyond Zebra is that the 
alphabet need not stop with the letter Z. Fantastic letter-characters festooned 
with strange loops are added to the alphabet. Each letter-character is 
represented with an equally fantastic creature. 
 In this book, Dr. Seuss captures for children the essence of 
Shakespeare’s admonition put in the mouth of Hamlet: There are more things in 
heaven and earth than are dreamt in your (read for 'your': 'anyone's') philosophy. 
Let us take both Dr. Seuss and Shakespeare to heart and consider first the limits 
of the study of conscience as it has been presented periodically in Grand Rounds 
over the years, recognizing that some limits are inherent in the method of the 
study while others are limits imposed by such factors as time dedicated to 
research, interest and support from academia and availability of research 
funding, not to mention the dominance of value neutrality in science and more 
recently in (managed) health care. Each of these factors contributes a valuational 
vector to the advancement or the obstruction of the study of conscience.  
 
  First, I have a short story to tell. At one of the clinical sites where I work, 
they used to insist upon, for a while only grudgingly tolerated, and then finally 
actively discouraged the dictation of (outpatient) psychiatric evaluations. It was 
during the time when dictations were still being typed that I would repeatedly 
have an odd experience. When I came to the Mental Status Examination part of 
the evaluation I would dictate something like “Billy could not readily identify his 
inner states” or “ Mary was able to describe her inner states in detail.” Now, 
invariably “inner states” was transcribed as “interstates.” And, in spite of my 
repeated efforts to correct the situation, the error persisted. Eventually, I resigned 
myself to my fate and perhaps even ceased, myself, to make much of a 
distinction between inner states and interstates. In the meantime, my work 
shifted from biological investigation in a single setting to clinical practice at 
various venues. I found, as I traveled from hospital to hospital on the interstate, I 
had time to wonder about the status of inner states-- what had become of them? 
Inside and outside, are they one and the same side though they don’t seem that 
way at all--like a Möebius surface? It has always seemed a strange loop.  
 
  Disclosures. I have forgotten to make my disclosures. These are, 
unfortunately, not funding source disclosures. They are, instead, disclosures 
about bias and basis. The first disclosure is this: I am persuaded that psychology 
has suffered long enough from a reduction of inner states to just two respectable 
ones: cognitions and affects. I suppose I should be grateful that any inner states 
have had their respectability restored after what happened to them historically.  
    
[Illustration A: A Brief History of the Psychology of Conscience] 
 
I need also to disclose my bias that we would do better to accept the irreducibility 
of at least the following inner states: thinking--feeling--valuing--willing.  Each I will 
treat as irreducible to the others. None will I treat as existing independently from 
the other. Moreover, I will be dealing with them as contextualized in moral 
development. The study of valuing (axiology) is characterized in the slide. 
 
[Illustration B: Axiology] 
 
Other theoretical biases--bases-- for this presentation, which I will disclose to you 
now are:  
  Discrete Emotions Theory (Darwin, Izard, Nathanson),  
  Attachment Theory (Bowlby),  
  some elements of Psychodynamic Theory,  
  some elements of Learning Theory, and  
  Developmental Stage Theory.   
 
THE CONSCIENCE PROJECT 
 
 We have provided a handout regarding conscience domains. Research 
conducted with normal children and adolescents (ages 5-17) has identified five 
domains of conscience functioning  (Stilwell & Galvin, 1985; Stilwell, Galvin & 
Kopta, 1991; Stilwell, Galvin, Kopta, and Norton1994; Stilwell, Galvin, Kopta and 
Padgett, 1996, and Stilwell, Galvin, Kopta, Padgett and Holt, in press).  
 CONCEPTUALIZATION OF CONSCIENCE (Stilwell, et al., 1991) 
measures the degree of inclusiveness and abstractness a person utilizes when 
providing a personal definition of conscience. Five transformations in 
conceptualization of conscience occur between the ages of 5 and 17. The most 
salient feature of each has been incorporated into the name of the stage:  
 
 EXTERNAL CONSCIENCE (age 6 and under),  
 BRAIN OR HEART CONSCIENCE (ages 7-11),   
 HEART/ MIND OR PERSONIFIED CONSCIENCE (ages12-13),  
 CONFUSED CONSCIENCE  (ages 14-15), and  
 INTEGRATED CONSCIENCE (ages 16- 17).  
 
Stage transitions in the other domains are anchored in the domain of 
conceptualization of conscience.  
 MORALIZATION OF ATTACHMENT (Stilwell, et al., in press) measures 
developmental transitions in the youngster's response to parental prohibitions 
and demands based upon how s/he links feelings of security, empathy and 
oughtness to child-parent and other child-authority figure relationships. 
 MORAL-EMOTIONAL RESPONSIVENESS  (Stilwell et al., 1994) 
measures developmental transitions in the way a child uses 1) anxiety and mood 
to regulate moral behavior and 2) processes of reparation and healing after 
wrongdoing to regain the physiological state normally experienced when feeling 
like a good person.  
 MORAL VALUATION (Stilwell, et al., 1996) measures developmental 
changes in the way a child justifies compliance or noncompliance with rules of 
conscience based on both reasoning and psychological defenses. This domain 
has three sub-domains based on how the child categorizes rules of conscience 
as authority- derived, self-derived and peer derived.  
 The last domain, MORAL VOLITION currently under analysis, measures 
developmental transitions in how a child uses his/her sense of autonomy in 
responding to and redefining rules of conscience.  
 Our findings based upon semi-structured interviewing of older children and 
adolescents are consonant with those of other investigators who have 
established a meaningful correspondence between younger children's narrative 
interpretations of hypothetical moral dilemmas and objective measures of their 
conscience functions. These investigations established that the "declarative 
knowledge" expressed in narrative form was associated with both past and 
contemporaneous "procedural" action tendencies and with maternal reports. 
Toddler to preschool age children's consciences were measured objectively at 
time #1 (ages 26 to 41 months) and again at time #2 (43-56 months), and 
narratively at time #2. Although the age ranges were relatively restricted, there 
was evidence of cross-sectional developmental trends, as well as strong 
differences between time #1 and time #2, congruent with most theories depicting 
moral development as a gradual shift to more internalized regulation, growing 
empathy, and awareness of wrongdoing. Older preschoolers expressed more 
themes of empathy and guilt, more themes of confession/reparation and fewer 
antisocial themes (Kochanska, Padavich and Koenig, 1996; also see Kochanska, 
1991 and 1993). So, here is a map of where we have been and where we might 
go -- an effort to convey the overall impression that there is so much left to do 
and so little time in the collective lifespan of our own scholarship in which to do it. 
  
  
 Currently, an adapted version of the Stilwell Conscience Interview (SCI) is 
being used to study conscience development under adverse conditions following 
the 1988 earthquake in Armenia (Goenjian, personal communication). The 
effects of early maltreatment on conscience development have also been 
studied. Subjects who endured early maltreatment had developmental delays 
and interferences with functioning in more conscience domains than those who 
were either spared such experiences or who endured maltreatment later in life. 
Correlations among neurobiological and moral psychological sequelae of 
maltreatment provide hints regarding the developmental psychobiology of 
conscience (Galvin, Stilwell, Shekhar, Kopta, and Goldfarb, 1997). 
  “On beyond” our particular study of normal conscience there may lie such 
things as a better understanding of the psychobiology of conscience, a 
longitudinal, prospective study of conscience development, conscience in the 
family and conscience across generations, conscience development in older age 
groups, conscience across cultures and across socioeconomic strata, 
conscience in adversity and conscience in crisis. I think also that the study of 
conscience more readily than current moral developmental psychology lends 
itself to investigation of various conscience malformations, for example racist or 
sexist conscience functioning.  
 Today, though, we will discuss some things that truly do lie on beyond 
conscience itself, nonetheless with definite bearing on our concerns in raising 
children who flourish as human beings and in guiding mental health professional 
students. So far I have introduced the metaphor of a strange loop in reference to 
inner states and interstates. Via what may appear at first to be a very strange 
loop we will go on beyond conscience, beginning with a case vignette, then 
reflect upon the relationship of moral developmental psychology to moral 
philosophy and both of these to ethics in medicine only to arrive once again at 
conscience, but conscience transformed into the mental health professional 
conscience. Subsequently, I will enlist the aid of a second metaphor: a bridge as 
one way that conscience can be conceptualized: a bridge between inner states, a 
bridge between fact and value. I hope to make you comfortable examining and 
using the concept of conscience not only towards the end of having a fuller 
understanding of patients but also, in the form of the mental health professional 
conscience, as a bridge to health professional ethics.  
 II. CASE VIGNETTE: 
 
  A MORNING IN THE LIFE OF DR. EVERY PERSON 
 
 DR. PERSON began her workday early by rounding at the adolescent 
psychiatric unit of the community hospital. She greeted the unit manager who 
buzzed her in through the locked door. This had become a routine between 
them. Dr. Person’s arrival was highly predictable, within a five-minute span. On 
the other hand, she never seemed to predict the need for the key she had been 
issued, and so, invariably stopped just outside the door to fumble around for it in 
her purse and turn out her coat pockets. With somewhat less but nonetheless 
fairly high reliability, Dr. Person’s pager would go off at just this time, with the 
usual effect of accelerating her fumbling and her burning her lip on the coffee as 
it lapped over the edge of the styrofoam cup she held clenched between her 
teeth.  
 She generally considered herself obliged to turn her pager on before she 
left home, sometimes there was a flurry of pages while she traveled the 
interstate, persisting until she had reached the unit. There was a time when she 
prided herself on being responsive to pages within 15 minutes--20 tops. She 
could remember her residency days when she would even exit the interstate to 
search for a pay phone in unfamiliar neighborhoods. She had decided not to do 
that anymore. She didn’t care for cellular phones. She didn’t think she (or anyone 
else for that matter) could adequately attend to her driving while using one, she 
didn’t like the intrusion on what she had come to regard as time for CME and, 
moreover, she thought the hospital should pay for a cellular phone if they wanted 
her so badly that they couldn’t wait for her to get there. So sometimes she didn’t 
respond to pages even within an hour --but really these occasions were rare. 
Even in therapy she usually excused herself to respond if the page came more 
than once, made the call indicated on the display, informed the caller that she 
was in a session and would get back later. Usually that was enough. In the event 
of a family emergency she was confident that she would be interrupted and 
informed right away.  In the course of her supervision as a resident, she had 
learned to discuss ahead of time with her patients how she would deal with 
intrusions upon the therapeutic process--intrusions like pages, phone calls, 
knocks on the door. “That was a good thing”, she thought. “One of the many 
casualties of managed care!” There were some exceptions to her rules regarding 
the pager, for example during critical therapy sessions she had been known to 
turn her pager off. How did she judge which were the critical therapy sessions? 
She really couldn’t come up with a ready answer how she made that 
determination. 
 Once on the unit she found her way to the work station in the back, 
registering that a person she did not know and a mental health technician she did 
know and especially appreciated for her blend of firm limit setting for-- and 
empathic responsiveness to-- patients. They were engaged in an animated 
discussion, words like ‘downsizing’ and ‘collaboration’ crested in her incomplete 
auditory experience of their conversation. That reminded her of a committee 
meeting she was expected to attend. The head of her Section had appointed her 
to a work group on facilitating the blending of hospital families. “Of course that 
means disowning some of the family members,” she allowed herself a cynical 
thought. She glanced again at the stranger and the ward staff, “The anxiety about 
this merger --collaboration-- (she corrected herself) is nearly palpable. Well I 
don’t want to be involved.” She wondered if she could ask Irene the unit manager 
to page her out of the work group meeting. “ I’m here to see patients, not set 
administrative policy,” she muttered under her breath as she pulled the chart of 
her first patient. 
 The patient was a 16-year-old girl who was diagnosed with depression not 
otherwise specified (Dr. Person wondered briefly about her diagnostic acumen--
couldn’t that diagnosis have been more sharply made? She hadn’t asked all the 
questions she needed to in order to rule out Major Depressive Episode and 
Dysthymia. What about bipolar disorder? Hadn’t considered that. Others had. 
This kid had big time diagnostic density. Well Depression NOS is good enough 
for the insurance companies...). It was a deeply ingrained habit for Dr. Person to 
review the record beginning at her last entry. She did not deviate from that 
routine today. She came across the utilization reviewer’s note, which reflected 
that the reviewer had been in touch with the insurance company. No more days 
without physician contact. She recognized the physician reviewer’s name. 
“Damn. He wouldn't authorize a New York minute unless I prescribe medication--
the one he likes for sexually abused, delinquent, multiple runaway girls.” They 
had had these discussions before. Dr. Person had made it a point to moderate 
the indignant tone she adopted the first time she had been told what medication 
to use. What had she said in the heat of her anger? Something like “I fully expect 
you will send me the double-blind placebo controlled studies you have on file to 
back your claim for this medication.”  She might not say so but she valued 
equanimity and composure and also a spirit of reaching a compromise. Still she 
would have been delighted if a militant group of irate patients could successfully 
sue the pants off the whole lot of physician reviewers for malpractice. Well, she 
could see her way clear to prescribing some kind of medication--maybe not the 
kind Dr. Reviewer prefers-- but some kind of medication for the kid. But in this 
case the kid was refusing medication altogether. The kid had a choice, didn’t 
she? And really, more than medicine, this kid needed intermediate length 
hospitalization or a therapeutic residential setting. The outpatient, the partial 
hospitalizations, the home based services and the two previous acute 
hospitalizations just hadn’t worked. The family was in chaos. This kid was 
severely and persistently mentally ill if ever a kid was. Dr. Person flipped over to 
the next page to the social worker’s note:  
“ Contacted Ms. So and So at such and such mental health center requesting 
that the local coordinating council reconvene to consider a more restrictive longer 
term placement for this child. Follow up call made to State Hospital Youth 
Services, waiting list is 6 mos. Follow up call made to DPW, previous designation 
of CHINS was dropped 1 year ago after reintegration into aunt’s home. Therefore 
no funding source readily identifiable for residential placement.” Dr. Person 
allowed herself a sigh as she closed the chart and went into the dayroom to find 
her patient.  
 Dr Person’s patient wasn’t in the dayroom. She had been secluded and 
restrained earlier that morning for escalating disruptive behavior (throwing her 
breakfast tray at a nurse), followed by an attempt to injure herself. The nurse told 
Dr. Every Person her patient denied any suicidal intent behind her self-injurious 
behavior but wondered about upgrading the suicide precautions a level, anyway. 
Dr. Person thought first about the duration of time to continue the restrictive 
intervention and decided on “up to 4hrs with release after 1/2 hour calm and able 
to process what had occurred.”  The precautions were another matter. Dr. 
Person was good at systematically weighing the risk factors for suicidality. 
 She considered that the attenuation of suicidal (and other) impulses varied 
according to affective, cognitive, defensive and volitional conditions which could 
be clinically judged from the history and the direction of changes evident on the 
mental status evaluation conducted daily. In Dr. Person’s acute psychiatric 
program, the patient’s suicidality was assessed, then work begun to reduce or 
eliminate maladaptive conditions and strengthen or introduce adaptive ones. Dr 
Person was generally governed by healing values, reckoning from clinical 
experience what was most adaptive. She was on the lookout for (and 
unequivocally on the side of) her patients having a full range of human emotions, 
versatile social problem solving skills and cognitive control of emotions, life 
affirming and generative values about self and others, self reliance, regulated self 
disclosure and appropriate help seeking, mature defense mechanisms, an 
internalized locus of control and a history of deliberate choosing with assumption 
of responsibility for the consequences of the choices made. All this she saw as 
adaptive, i.e. she positively valued (and, moreover, she recommended her 
patients do likewise). In contrast, psychopathological or maladaptive interference 
would be discerned in a constricted range of emotions, high levels of background 
rage, failure to stop and think (an impulsive cognitive style) or an absence of 
alternative, means/end and consequential thinking, absence of life affirming and 
generative values or presence of destructive values about self and others (more 
and more she suspected depression as being a valuational, not just a mood, 
disorder the psychobiology of which involves an uncoupling of the facts and 
values in a person’s life), identification of suicidal behavior as a coping strategy 
as in escape, reunification and retributive fantasies, reliance upon primitive 
defense mechanisms such as repression and projection, denial and minimization, 
an external locus of control, assumption of victimhood and a development 
impoverished in deliberate choosing and responsibility taking. Now Dr. Person 
knew where this kid was at, and she would try to persuade Dr. Reviewer on the 
grounds of cost efficiency that the kid should stay in the hospital until she had at 
least made some preliminary connection with her life affirming values, i.e. had 
come up with some reasons to live and, in accordance with those, a survival 
plan. Dr. Person wondered if Dr. Reviewer would approve additional days if the 
kid’s self-injurious behavior could be interpreted as suicidal.  
 
COMMENTARY  
  
 When facing a decision about complex issues, a person is often advised 
to “consult his/her conscience". What does this mean? In particular, what does it 
mean for a person entering one of the health care professions--when choosing a 
career, in the midst of the training program, becoming established in community 
practice, or working in a teaching, mentoring or research role? The health care 
field grows in complexity each year. as do external efforts to control complexity, 
through regulations and practice guidelines established by government agencies, 
professional organizations, or health maintenance organizations. While these 
external efforts may in some ways support “the ethical fitness” (to use Kidder’s 
felicitous term--see reference below) of health care professionals, there may be 
other ways in which this externalization actually undermines and reverses the 
process of internalization of conscience functions which began in the 
professional’s childhood --to the detriment of both the professional and his/her 
patients. 
 Conscience formation begins in childhood and continues throughout the 
lifespan. Empirical studies of conscience development during the formative years 
of childhood and adolescence demonstrate that there are moral aspects to many 
domains of development, each contributing different dimensions to one’s 
personal moral system. There are moral dimensions of attachment experiences, 
the regulation and balancing of emotions, the development of reasoning and 
psychological defenses--all against a background of being engaged by wonder. 
Values honoring the human experience, learned in relationship to authority 
figures, in one’s community of peers as well as in self-discovery, also determine 
the issues of conscience toward which one becomes willing to exert his/her moral 
energies. 
 One may begin preparations for a life as a health care professional naive 
to the moral dimensions of self that led to career choice and even more naive to 
the moral dimensions inherent in medical training and practice. Unless the moral 
dimensions of self-development, i.e., the development of a professional 
conscience, are emphasized during the training years, graduates may exit 
programs still naive to transformations that have occurred in themselves as a 
result of exposure to morally complex medical issues. Moral dilemmas in practice 
may lead to decisions that should have been preceded by further moral 
examination.  
 Medical school, residency, psychology internship, nursing school, 
occupational and physical therapy and other allied health professional schools 
pose extreme challenges. While not necessarily experiences of adversity, the 
challenges posed by health professional schools nonetheless have in common 
with experiences of adversity, the characteristic of subjecting developing human 
beings to intermittent and sometimes prolonged periods of stress. Facing and 
mastering adversity is generally seen as conducive to ethical fitness. However, 
empirical studies in children who have been maltreated suggest there are times 
when adversity undermines rather than refines ethical fitness. Is there also an 
‘inverted-U’ shaped curve for the salutary effects of health professional school 
challenges to the development of professional conscience? 
 How are we to understand and to enhance the moral development of 
beginning healthcare professionals, to stimulate their thinking as well as the 
thinking of those who teach them regarding the moral dimensions of self that 
motivate involvement in a healthcare profession? How are we to learn what 
changes occur in the way they think and respond to moral issues connected to 
medical decisions in the course of training?  Empirical research with respect to 
ethical fitness in the health care professional community will be invaluable in 
deliberations of regulatory policy makers who are concerned to preserve the 
integrity of the professional conscience.  
 
 
III. FROM THE DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL REASONING 
TO CONSCIENCE.  
      
[Illustration C Map of Köenigsburg] 
 
 
  Köenigsberg is a town famous for at least two things. The first is the 
topographical puzzle of how to cross its seven bridges one time and only one 
time each. This fascinated the mathematician Euler. The second is a person, the 
philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kant stood 5ft tall and his personal life 
has been described as ‘the most regular of regular verbs’. His parents were lower 
middle class, industrious and deeply religious, as Kant, himself, remained all his 
life. He was a local boy who attended the University in his hometown. He studied 
classics and theology and then physics and philosophy. Early in his career he did 
original work in astronomy and physics. However, his principle work is The 
Critique of Pure Reason, which embodied what Kant called his “Copernician 
Revolution” in the theory of knowledge.2 Kant took seriously David Hume’s 
critiques of current theories of knowledge. He wanted to answer Hume’s 
criticisms of the claims of science and to show that an a priori knowledge of 
nature is possible.3 In essence he saw knowledge as a cooperative affair in 
which both mind and object make a contribution. Certain ways in which the mind 
organizes experiences, fits experiences into categories, can be known prior to 
any particular experience. The following analogy has been used:  
 
Suppose we have a machine for sorting oranges that consists of an       
inclined plane with holes of various sizes. Oranges rolling down the  
surface of the plane fall through the holes into boxes underneath. If  
one of the holes is say two and one half inches in diameter, then no  
orange greater than that diameter will fall through to the box underneath.... 
Although there are many things about the oranges that we could not tell  
without examining them... we can know something about their size.... 4  
 
 Kant was also interested in providing an account of values that he 
believed lay outside scientific or matter of fact knowledge5 (Jones, 1980). Kant 
gave three formulations of his categorical imperative, one of which, the second, 
is quoted here:  
  “So act as to treat humanity whether in thine own person or that of any 
 other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only”6 
 (Kant, translated H.J. Paton, 1964). 
    
     
 We’ll get back to moral philosophy shortly--there is a loop within a loop 
here to follow first-- from Kant to Piaget, with whom we take up developmental 
psychology. Piaget was very attracted to philosophy, in particular to Bergson and 
to Aristotle, but the similarity of his structuralism to that of Kant is especially 
noteworthy7 (Elkind, 1980). Piaget is known for his cognitive developmental 
psychology in which he saw intelligence as a biological adaptation with a logical 
substructure that unfolds in a series of epigenetic stages. By epigenesis is meant 
that growth and development are not preformed but rather, are sequentially 
created. At each stage in development the preceding structure writes the 
program for the next succeeding structure, however there is also an emergent 
character to the next stage.  
 Piaget identified the processes of assimilation and accommodation as the 
means by which the child advances through cognitive stages from sensorimotor 
to formal operations (Piaget, 1976; Elkind, 1980). His ideas are really not so 
strange to us who have been reared with physical theories that tell us that matter 
tells space how to be shaped and space tells matter how to move, or that 
observation itself alters the probabilistic character of observable phenomena. 
However the concept of developmental emergence of organic wholes greater 
than the sum of their parts transforming without loss of identity and having the 
capacity for self regulation (homeostasis) still vie with mechanistic and 
reductionistic explanations.8  
 Like Kant, Piaget was not just interested in how knowledge is possible in 
the relationship of the knower to the known. He was also interested in practical or 
moral reasoning. So, naturally, he went off to the mountains to see how Swiss 
children played marbles together.  
 More precisely he wanted to find out what changes occurred in their 
understanding of, acceptance of, and exceptions allowed for, rules in the game. 
Piaget anticipated game theory- one example of which might be the amusing but 
externalized conscience depicted in the poster shown earlier. There are 
similarities in playing games like marbles and learning moral rules but there are 
also differences, important ones, which cannot be captured by game-theoretic 
suggestions that morality is reducible to rational self-interest (egoism). Indeed, 
even if one is committed to a position that rational self-interest is, or should be, 
the sole basis for making choices, he or she is still going to have puzzles with 
strange loops. Consider the prisoners’ dilemma as if it were your own. 
 
 [Inset 1:  
            
                                    THE PRISONER’S  DILEMMA 
 
 THERE ARE TWO PRISONERS ACCUSED OF CONSPIRING  
 AGAINST THE STATE.  
  
 THE JUDGE GIVES EACH TWO ALTERNATIVES :  
 TO CONFESS OR NOT TO CONFESS.  
  
 IN A PLEA BARGAINING ARRANGEMENT,  
 THE JUDGE OFFERS A DEAL:  
   
 IF ONE PRISONER CONFESSES AND THE OTHER DOES  
 NOT, THE CONFESSOR WILL BE RELEASED AND THE   
 OTHER WILL GO TO PRISON FOR TEN YEARS. 
 
 IF BOTH CONFESS, BOTH GO TO PRISON FOR FIVE  
 YEARS.  
   
 IF NEITHER CONFESSES, BOTH GO TO PRISON FOR A  
 YEAR.  
 
 
REFERENCE:  Attributed to the Princeton mathematician, Albert Tucker in 
a 1950 lecture on game theory. Version cited appears in Kidder (1995), an 
alternative version with references to the literature on game theory 
appears in Nozick (1981).                     ] 
       
 Historical dramas provide some compelling examples of persons 
balancing game playing and an essentially moral life which puts them in constant 
jeopardy: Thomas More’s resort to legalisms as depicted in A Man For All 
Seasons, Oskar Shindler’s various ploys and deceptions to save Jews as 
depicted in Shindler’s List. A less dramatic example is the mental health care 
professional working under a managerial structure that proves to be highly 
insensitive to virtuous practice conforming to healing values. The initial 
recommendation to find different managers becomes less and less an option as 
corporate medicine devolves to more and more survivalistic values, and an 
insensitivity to virtuous practice becomes more and more commonplace. To what 
extent might such a mental health professional become “game” in the service of 
his or her conscience? 9
 Eventually, Piaget (1965) began posing some dilemmas with moral 
characteristics to children of different ages to see how they reasoned morally, for 
example, about intentionality. He proposed two stages of moral development, the 
heteronomous and the autonomous. In the heteronomous stage, rules are 
explained as having authorship in some ultimate authority; in the autonomous 
stage, rules are explained as having been derived from mutual agreement and 
are amenable to change. Kohlberg extended the use of moral dilemmas, the 
most famous of which is The Heinz Dilemma. 
 
 
[Inset 2: 
 
                                   THE HEINZ DILEMMA 
 
 HEINZ’S WIFE IS DYING OF CANCER AND NEEDS A DRUG THAT  
 AN ENTERPRISING DRUGGIST HAS INVENTED. THE DRUGGIST  
 DEMANDS SUCH A HIGH PRICE THAT HEINZ CANNOT RAISE THE  
 MONEY. HEINZ’S DILEMMA, THEN, IS WHETHER OR NOT TO  
 STEAL THE DRUG TO SAVE HIS DYING WIFE.                      ]  
 
 
  Kohlberg (1981) combined the concepts of cognitive development and 
moral philosophy into a stage theory of moral reasoning. He postulated three 
levels each with two sub-stages. Pre-conventional moral reasoning is motivated 
by fear of punishment, desire for reward, and ideas of instrumental exchange. 
Conventional moral reasoning is motivated by understanding the roles of 
goodness (good child, good parent, good worker, good citizen, etc.) and 
achieved through compliance with established family and societal rules and law. 
Post-conventional moral reasoning is motivated by an understanding of universal 
principles, applicable to all human beings. Kohlberg saw justice as the ultimate 
moral principle. Gilligan (1982) found the conjoined principles of interpersonal 
care and responsibility to be more pertinent to women’s lives (Stilwell et al., 
1991).  
    
 [Inset 3: 
 
  KOHLBERG STAGES 
     
  Stage 1  
  Punishment & Obedience 
 
  Stage 2 
  Individual/Instrumental 
 
  Stage 3 
  Mutual Interpersonal  
  Relationships & Conformity 
 
  Stage 4    
  Social System & /Conscience  
  Maintenance  
                                                 
  Stage 5                           
  Prior Rights & Social Contract 
 
  Stage 6         
  Universal Ethical Principles                    ] 
   
   
 Kohlberg’s theory of moral obligation is cognitive developmental, that is, 
the development of the idea of moral obligation is related to general skills of 
rational reasoning. Kohlberg’s theory, like most theories with vitality, underwent 
revisions before his death in 1989. No doubt, what comprises the definitive 
version will be disputed for some time. A full critique is beyond what we can 
accomplish in this presentation. {Critical commentary may be found among the 
references, provided in the annotated bibliography. In particular: Shweder, 
Mahapatra and Miller’s contribution found in Kagan and Lamb (eds), 1987, and 
Rest’s own contribution in Rest and Narvaez (eds), 1994.}  Some questions that 
have been posed, nonetheless, deserve mention. First, is cognitive development 
stage like? Shweder et al. argue that human cognitive growth is not very stage 
like and no single cognitive stage (Piagetian preoperational, concrete operational 
or formal operational stage) is a characteristic of an individual’s cognitive 
functioning--it may depend on what one is thinking about and how the problem is 
presented. Likewise doubts have been raised about whether moral growth is very 
stage like. Apart from this, to the extent that staging warrants being done, can it 
be done without entailing value judgment? 
 Patterns of moral development have been described as hierarchical 
stages ---a term that has been criticized as being freighted with valuational 
judgment taking form in descriptors such as “more mature”, “ more adaptive”,  
“higher level” or simply “better”.  Rest (1994) argues that all that is meant by 
being at a “higher stage” is being in a better position to make sense out of the 
world and derive guides for decision-making. Rest denies that a meaning of 
higher moral status is intended. Nonetheless, there is something compelling  (i.e. 
having an ‘oughtness’ of its own) about a developmental descriptor like ‘better’ 
with an intimation that it marks a trajectory towards an ultimate if unattainable 
good or perfection. One may ask, following Williams’ lead (see endnote #12).“ 
How much valuational thickness does the concept of development have built into 
it?” 
 Almost at antipodes to the critique of staging as thinly veiled value 
judgment, others criticize Kohlberg’s methodology for reducing the study of moral 
concepts to the study of verbal justification of moral ideas, a skill which highly 
moral persons may lack. On the other hand, Kohlberg has been defended on the 
grounds that in his reformulated theory he expresses the view that his is not a 
complete theory of moral development but rather a theory of justice reasoning. 
    Kohlberg’s theory of moral obligation is cognitive developmental, that is, 
the development of the idea of moral obligation is related to general skills of 
rational reasoning. There are alternative theories. From the psychodynamic 
quarter, Henry (1983), for example, viewed the stage theory of moral reasoning 
as limiting itself to measuring levels of sophistication of the rationalization 
defense mechanism. Elsewhere we have reviewed the literature on the 
importance of moral emotion in addition to moral reasoning (Stilwell, et al, 1994). 
Turiel, Nucci and Smetana’s social interaction theory proposes that the 
development of the idea of moral obligation is related to social experiences with a 
restricted class of events that have objective or intrinsic implications for justice, 
rights, harm and the welfare of others. Moral obligation and the idea of 
conventional obligation are both present universally and differentiated from each 
other in early childhood.  Another alternative is the social communication theory 
articulated by Shweder et al.  They perceive Kohlberg (but see Blasi’s 
commentary upon Shweder et al in the same volume) as having rested his later 
stages (5 & 6) wherein emerge the genuine understanding of the idea of moral 
obligation, upon earlier stages (3 & 4) that are convention or consensus -based. 
Social communication theorists question that there are universal developmental 
processes leading the child to differentiate and contrast moral versus 
conventional obligations.  
 Another question has been: is the (Kohlbergian dilemma) test biased in 
favor of Westernized elites? The finding of rare postconventional thinking in the 
human species (it has been estimated that, on a worldwide scale, only 1 or 2% of 
all responses are purely postconventional) has raised methodological and 
conceptual concerns about Kohlberg’s theory (Shweder et al., 1987).  
 Shweder et al conducted cross-cultural research. They compared 180 
American adults and children from Hyde Park, 180 Brahman Hindu adults and 
children and 120 Hindu adults and children who were members of the castes 
designated by the government as “scheduled” living in Bhubaneswar, Orissa, 
India. They presented thirty-nine behavioral cases, representing a range of family 
life and social practices developed on the basis of ethnographic knowledge of 
community life in Bhubaneswar and Hyde Park. For example,  
“ A widow in your community eats fish two or three times a week.” Then they 
asked questions of the informants aimed at assessing the existence or 
nonexistence of an obligation and its perceived importance, whether the 
obligation was regarded as having a moral character or was simply regarded as 
a convention, and how it was perceived according to the dichotomies: universal 
vs. relative, and unalterable vs. alterable. Of the thirty-nine cases, American and 
Brahman adults displayed similar judgments of right versus wrong concerning 10 
practices and disagreement concerning 16 practices. For 11 other practices there 
was disagreement in one or the other community about what was right or wrong. 
However, several culture specific wrongs were seen by the Brahmin informants 
as more severe transgressions than many of the events viewed as wrong in both 
cultures. In the Oriya Brahman community it was considered wrong for a doctor 
at a hospital to refuse to treat an accident victim because he was too poor to pay 
but that transgression was not quite as serious as a widow eating fish, a relative 
eating beef, or the firstborn son cutting his hair the day after his father’s death. 
They interpreted their findings to favor the view that moral events cannot be 
distinguished from conventional events on substantive grounds. Nonetheless, 
they believed themselves to have discovered some principles and practices to be 
strong candidates for universal features in any moral code--namely:   
keeping promises,  
protecting the vulnerable,  
avoiding incest,  
fair allocation/justice,  
reciprocity and  
respect for property  
as virtuous; and arbitrary assault, nepotism and biased classification as vices. 
Third they found that it is not a universal idea that social practices are 
conventional formations, deriving their authority from a culture-bound consensus. 
Unlike Americans, not all people have a place in their view of the world for the 
idea that social practices are conventions. There may, however, be context-
dependent moral thinking evident. Post conventional moral conceptions of 
obligation represent the dominant mode of rule understanding held by all 
informants, Indian and American, child and adult, male and female. The post-
conventional emphasis in the study population in America is on the natural right 
to free contract, personal choice, and individual liberty. The post-conventional 
emphasis in the study population in India is on the natural duty to respect the 
truths of Hindu dharma, which concern the justice of received differences and 
inequalities, the moral implications of asymmetrical interdependencies in nature 
and the vulnerabilities and differential rationality of social actors. The social 
communications theorists do not deny the universality and functional significance 
of moral emotions. However their project has been to understand why a 
transgression is defined as a transgression by looking in the direction of the 
moral code as a rational organization of concepts and principles. (Shweder,et. 
al., 1987).  
 To conclude these very preliminary considerations pertinent to the cross-
cultural conscience (which has threatened to overtake our critical review of 
Kohlbergian theory), an evocative word-picture of conscience is offered. A 
conscience concept, not unlike what the children in the Conscience Study have 
taught us, calls from across both space and time. It is derived from the classic 
Chinese philosopher Mencius:  
 
 .... [H]eaven’s guidance comes as inborn feelings or inclinations to 
behavior. These are neither merely inclinations to egoistic preservation 
nor even a general inclination for altruistic benefit. Heaven’s endowment is 
a fully instinctive morality in seed form. Each of us is born with genetic 
inclinations to behavior. As we mature these inclinations grow in strength 
and sensitivity to the moral setting. Barring deprivation or distortion from 
external influences, they will eventually yield sage-like Confucian moral 
character. The heart can be thought of as similar to conscience in Western 
theories except that the moral discrimination capacity postulated by 
Mencius grows in accuracy throughout life. 
 The inclinations to behavior make up the xin  (‘heart-mind’)-the ruler 
of the body.... four seeds or hearts develop into the four primary 
virtues...the first seed is... sympathy for other humans. That fully 
developed becomes the virtue of humanity. The second is our penchant to 
feel shame, which motivates the development of i (‘morality’). The third is 
our disposition to show respect and deference toward social superiors. 
This motivates conformity to li  [previously defined as ‘a positive cultural 
way’ or ‘conventions’]. Finally we have a congenital tendency to discern 
shi-fei [previously discussed in making a shi (‘this:right’) or a fei  
(‘this:wrong’) assignment]. We distinguish in action and attitude between 
something approved in the context ...and something not approved. This 
tendency to have pro-con action guiding attitudes grows into practical 
wisdom, zhi (‘knowledge’).... Fully ripened, the heart’s organic constitution 
puts us in harmony with a cosmic moral force-- the flood-like qi  (‘breath’). 
We simultaneously use it and are used by it.... 10
 
 Lastly, on conceptual grounds, Kohlberg has been criticized for excluding 
“divergent rationalities” in the moral domain. The idea of divergent rationalities is 
sorted into the following claims: there exists more than one rationally defensible 
moral code; and, in any moral code with rational appeal, some concepts are 
mandatory while others are discretionary (both are needed in the code).  The 
mandatory concepts in Kohlbergian theory include the abstract idea of natural 
law, the abstract principle of harm and the abstract principle of justice. Kohlberg 
was seen by critics as insisting upon discretionary concepts one or more of which 
most thinkers in the world are apt to question: a rights-based conception of 
natural law, natural individualism, his conception of who is a person, what are the 
‘territories of the self’, a conception of justice as equality in which likenesses are 
emphasized and differences overlooked --in these respects he was very much 
influenced by (or found common cause with) the moral philosopher John Rawls, 
a Kantian contractarian. Rawls is noted for his ‘original position’ and ‘the veil of 
ignorance’. 
 
 
 [Inset 4: 
THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE 
 
 IMAGINE DECISION-MAKERS ARE SITUATED BEHIND A VEIL OF 
 IGNORANCE. THEY ARE COMPLETELY SELF-INTERESTED. THEY  
 ARE ENTIRELY RATIONAL. THEY HAVE FULL ACCESS TO 
 GENERAL KNOWLEDGE. THEY DO NOT HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF 
 ANYTHING THAT MIGHT MAKE THEM DIFFERENT FROM 
 OTHERS. THEY ARE IGNORANT OF THEIR OWN CLASS, SOCIAL 
 STATUS OR WEALTH; THEY DON’T KNOW THEIR LEVEL OF 
 INTELLIGENCE OR STRENGTH, THEIR AVERSION TO RISK, 
 THEIR OPTIMISM OR PESSIMISM. THEY KNOW NOTHING OF 
 THEIR OWN SOCIETY. THEY DON’T EVEN KNOW THE  
 GENERATION TO WHICH THEY BELONG.  
  WHAT PRINCIPLES WILL THEY USE FOR DECISION-MAKING?1
 
 1. Kidder, R. (1995): How Good People Make Tough Choices. Fireside/  
 Simon and Schuster; New York. pp. 160-161.  
 
 Also see:  
Kymlicka, W. (1993): The social contract tradition. In: A Companion to 
Ethics, P. Singer (ed.) Blackwell Publishers Inc., pp. 191ff. 
 
 Rawls, J. (1971): A Theory of Justice.  
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; Cambridge, 
Massachucetts.                      ] 
 
  
KOHLBERG IN CONTEXT 
  
 Since Kohlberg’s stages may be more familiar, it is reasonable to ask :  
What is the relationship of Kohlbergian stages to our theory of conscience? (See 
Table I). At first blush, it appears that the Kohlbergian stages (as rendered by 
Thomas, 1995) are roughly equivalent to the stages we have identified in the 
conscience domains CONCEPTUALIZATION and MORAL VALUATION 
(domains which, when taken together, subsume the essential components of 
moral reasoning or judgment). However, what Table I really represents is a 
remapping of Kohlbergian stages as if they were not successive stages within the 
same broadly conceived (cognitive-developmental) domain of moral reasoning or 
judgement at all. Rather, each Kohlbergian stage is recast as a stage in a 
domain or combination of domains of conscience development. Begin with 
Kohlberg’s Pre-conventional Stage 1. Lickona (1983) calls it the “unquestioning 
obedience” stage of moral reasoning, emerging around the time of kindergarten. 
We discern this stage as having similarities to Conscience Stage I 
(EXTERNALIZED, modal age 6 and under) in the domains 
CONCEPTUALIZATION and AUTHORITY-DERIVED VALUATION. Yet, 
Kohlberg’s Stage 1 also has commonalities with Conscience Stage I in the 
domain of MORAL EMOTIONAL RESPONSIVENESS in which fear of 
punishment and enjoyment of reward are among the emotions becoming 
moralized. There may even be a weak correspondence of Kohlberg Stage 1 and 
Conscience Stage I in the domain of MORAL VOLITION as well, while there is no 
particular correspondence with the domain of MORAL ATTACHMENT. It is 
sufficient to make the point that moral development in the form of moralized 
attachment is not readily discernible from the perspective of Kohlberg’s Stage I. 
 Kohlberg’s Stage 2 (Lickona calls it the “ what’s--in--it--for--me” stage, 
arising in early elementary grades) involves a shift of focus to what in 
Conscience terminology is SELF-DERIVED VALUATION roughly at Conscience 
Stage II (BRAIN/ HEART, modal age 7-11). In that sub-domain of MORAL 
VALUATION, the “Stage of Rules,” children remain consequence oriented but 
also encode rules, valuing the rule-making process itself. Lickona calls 
Kohlberg’s Stage 3 the “interpersonal conformity” stage, identifiable in middle to 
upper elementary grades and early to mid teens. Lickona's description 
corresponds to Conscience Stage III (PERSONIFIED, modal age 12 to 13) and 
Conscience Stage IV (CONFUSED, modal age 14 to 15) in the domains MORAL 
ATTACHMENT and SELF-DERIVED VALUATION. Lickona calls Kohlberg’s 
Stage 4 “responsibility to the system”, emergent in high school or late teens. It 
maps to Conscience Stage V (INTEGRATED, modal age 16 and older) in the 
domain MORAL VALUATION, AUTHORITY DERIVED, PEER DERIVED, and 
SELF DERIVED in a triangular balance. Kohlberg’s Stage 5 (Lickona calls it 
“principled conscience”, young adulthood) may be mapped on to the domain 
MORAL VOLITION and Kohlberg’s Stage 6 on to the domain PEER DERIVED 
VALUATION but at Conscience Stages yet to be identified empirically. 
Something is illuminated by this mapping exercise. In particular, the signals of 
developmental activity in moral emotion, and moral attachment, are not always 
captured by Kohlbergian stages. In Kohlbergian Staging operations, signals from 
the domain MORAL VOLITION escape detection altogether.  So, in Table I, 
many cells generated by SCI stages and domains are left empty. In effect, by 
following the moral developmental line discerned exclusively from the cognitive 
perspective, one is apt to miss the other concurrent, interactive and 
interdependent developmental lines readily discernible from the standpoint of the 
stages and domains of conscience formation.  
 
{Table I.   
  
KOHLBERG IN CONTEXT 
  
 
SCI Domain 
 
STAGES 
Lickona's [Kolbergian] Stages 
 
 
SCI 
 
CON
 
MER 
 
V2 
 
ATC 
 
V3
 
VI 
MV 
Stage 0 (preschool) Egocentric 
 
 
* 
 
 
 
 
    
 
Stafe 1 (KG) Obedience 
[Punishment and Obedience] 
 
 
I  (6) 
 
X 
 
X 
    
X 
Stage 2 (early elementary) 
"What's In It For Me?" 
[Individual/Instrumental] 
 
 
II  (7-11) 
 
X 
  
X 
   
Stage 3 (early to mid teens) 
Interpersonal Conformity 
[Mutual Interpersonal 
Relationships & Conformity] 
 
 
III  (12-13) 
 
X 
  
X 
 
X 
  
Stage 4 (high school) 
Responsibility to the System 
[Social System & /Conscience  
Maintenance] 
 
 
IV  (14-15) 
 
X 
    
X 
 
Stage 5 (young adulthood) 
Principled Conscience 
[Prior Rights & Social Contract] 
 
 
V  (16+) 
 
X 
  
X 
  
X 
 
X 
[Stage 6] 
[Universal Ethical Principles] 
       
 * Lickona adopted Stage 0 (preschool) from Damon and Selman.  
 The SCI age range was 5-17 years old so there is no isomorphic mapping 
 that can be done on this grid. However, Lickona describes the perception 
 of right as “I should get my own way," which seems to highlight autonomy,  
and the reasoning as  punishment/reward based. At Stage I Lickona 
describes the perception of right as “I should do as I’m told” and the 
reasoning as “ to stay out of trouble.” In essence Lickona has split 
Kohlberg’s first stage, Punishment and Obedience into two: Lickona Stage 
0: Punishment and Lickona Stage I: Obedience.                       }  
     
(We hope that) in identifying domains of moral development, we are specifying in 
some detail an important (if not the most important) aspect of human nature. It is 
in our nature to follow certain discernible patterns of conscience development. As 
Rest says in introducing his four-component model of moral development (moral 
sensitivity, moral judgment, moral motivation and moral character), the trick is to 
show how all these pieces fit together (Rest, 1994).   
         
V. FROM CONSCIENCE DEVELOPMENT TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
THE STORY OF GLAUCON’S RINGS 
 
Long before J.R.R. Tolkien wrote about Bilbo and Frodo Baggins and the 
One Ring, long before Wagner’s Siegfried made his Rhine Journey, long 
before the Nieberlungenliad had become an epic poem, there was an 
Athenian named Glaucon who challenged another Athenian named 
Socrates to imagine a ring having the power to invest it’s wearer with 
invisibility, but not only invisibility. Glaucon’s ring enabled its wearer to act 
immorally with no external penalty: to rob, murder or rape without being 
caught or punished....                 
 
  As mentioned before, “One may ask ‘How much valuational thickness 
does the concept of development have?’” Indeed, the philosopher Robert Nozick 
has argued that degree of organic unity (cf. organismic developmentalist views) 
seems to be the dimension that best captures our notion of intrinsic value.11 
Descriptors of intrinsic value easily slip into developmentalist language because 
of developmentalism’s philosophical foundations.  Such terms introduce a kind of 
intuitionism (cf. Wilson, 1993) or naturalism into our understanding of 
conscience.  
 
[Inset 5:   
INTUITIONISM 
 
 Theories of moral knowledge according to which we have  
 immediate knowledge of the rightness and wrongness of  
 certain actions or the intrinsic goodness of certain kinds  
 of things, states or affairs.1 
  
 SOME TYPES: 
 
Initially intuitionism was defined in contrast to Mills’ utilitarianism and was 
associated with pluralism, the view that there are a large number of moral 
principles that cannot be put in any general order of importance in a way 
that would help resolve conflicts between them. Later intuitionism was 
associated with the position that concepts about right and wrong are un-
analyzable, whether there is more than one principle or not.  In 
subsequent historical developments, even some utilitarians (e.g. Sidgwick) 
relied upon intuitionism. Intuitionism in the newer sense and pluralism in 
the older sense were reunited in the work of Ross and Prichard in the 
1930s.2  Ross’s ethic of prima facie duties, is pluralistic, deontological and 
 intuitionistic. 
 
  In A THEORY OF JUSTICE, Rawls discounted the sense of intuitionism  
 as a way of knowing and reverted to identifying it with pluralism.  
 According to Rawls, there are two features to intuitionist theories: 
 
  1) they consist of a plurality of first principles which may  
      conflict. 
  2) they include no explicit method, no priority rules, for  
          weighing these principles against one another.3  
 
 1. A DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY, T. Mautner (ed.)  
 Blackwell Publishers Inc.; Cambridge, Mass., 1996. 
 2. Dancy, J. (1993): Intuitionism. In: A COMPANION TO ETHICS,  
 P. Singer (ed.) Blackwell Publishers Inc., pp.411--420. 
 3.  Rawls, J. (1971):  A THEORY OF JUSTICE.  
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Mass.pp.  
34-35.                      ] 
  
 [Inset 6: 
NATURALISM 
  
  
 A cognitivist family of doctrines stating that 
 * moral judgements are propositions, capable of truth and falsity 
 *some moral judgments are true 
 * there are no irreducible moral facts or properties 
 
 Some Types: 
 hedonistic naturalists reduce ‘facts’ about goodness to facts about
 pleasure and pain 
 Aristotelian naturalists prefer ‘facts’ about human nature and human  
 flourishing, but 
 preferred ‘facts’ may be sociological, psychological, scientific, 
 metaphysical, or theological.  
 
 Contemporary example: Mary Midgley ...drawing on ethological 
 literature, she suggests given our natures, there are constraints on the 
 kinds of lives humans will find fulfilling, and hence human action.1
 She cites this passage from Darwin’s Descent of Man: 
 
  ...[A]ny animal whatever , endowed with well-marked social  
  instincts, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or  
  conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers had become as  
  well-developed....the social instincts...with the aid of active  
  intellectual powers and the effects of habit, naturally lead to the  
  Golden Rule, “As ye would that men do unto you, do ye to  
  them likewise” and this lies at the foundation of morality.... 2       
   
 
 1. Pidgen, C.R. (1993) Naturalism. In: P.Singer (ed.)  
 A COMPANION TO ETHICS, Cambridge, Mass: 
  Blackwell Publishers. pp. 421-431. 
 2. Midgley, M. (1993) The origin of ethics. In: P. Singer (ed.)  
 A COMPANION TO ETHICS Cambridge, Mass: 
  Blackwell Publishers.  pp. 3-13.                                                                  ]   
 
 
There may be warrant for this from the standpoint of moral philosophy, but it 
deserves explication. To establish from a psychobiological standpoint that 
something is characteristic of human nature, especially something  as potential 
as a capacity or a developmental domain, does not, at least prima facie, provide 
a compelling  argument for valuing it. Some say that it is an aspect of male 
nature to disseminate genes as widely as possible through sexual activity while it 
is an aspect of female nature to be as selective as possible when it comes to 
mating in order to secure optimum survival conditions for her offspring. That 
these are aspects of human nature does not indicate their moral value. This 
distinction is sometimes termed the fact-value or is-ought distinction. Hume 
wrote: 
 
  In every system of morality, which I have  
  hitherto met with, I have always remark’d, that  
  the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary  
  way of reasoning....makes observations concerning human  
  affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that  
  instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is and  
  is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected  
  with an ought or ought not. This change is imperceptible; 
  but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or  
  ought not, expresses some new relationship or affirmation  
  ‘tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at  
  the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems  
  altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a  
  deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. 
  But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall  
  presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded,  
  that this small attention wou’d subvert all the vulgar system of  
  morality....12   
 
[Inset 7:  
NATURALISTIC FALLACY 
 
  According to G. E.  Moore, the fallacy committed by  
  all ethical naturalists.1  
  Sometimes put in terms of  ‘Hume’s Law’: “no ‘IS’ to ‘Ought’”  or , 
  positively, as “ the autonomy of ethics.” 
   
  There are three forms of autonomy of ethics: 
 
  1) logical autonomy : moral judgments differ fundamentally  
          from factual propositions 
  2) semantic autonomy: moral words don’t mean the same as  
           other words and cannot be paraphrased in a non-moral idiom 
  3) ontological autonomy : moral judgments to be true must  
          answer to a realm of  sui generis  (‘of its own kind’) moral facts  
          and properties. 
 
  Logical and semantic autonomy are not threats to naturalism. 2
 
 
 1. A DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY, T.  Mautner (ed.)  
     Blackwell Publishers Inc.; Cambridge, Mass.,1996. 
 2. Pidgen, C.R. (1993) Naturalism. In: P. Singer (ed.)  
     A COMPANION TO ETHICS, Cambridge, Mass: 
     Blackwell Publishers. pp. 421-431.  
                         ] 
     
 On what grounds do domains of conscience take pride of place among 
aspects of our nature such that we are compelled to value them any more than 
other natural tendencies? Nozick argues the matter this way:  
   
Suppose a contest were being held to design a valuable or precious 
being. A prize is to be given simply for succeeding; the winner does not 
have to justify the application of the terms “valuable” or “precious.” If you 
participated in this contest, which characteristics would you give your 
entry? Consider the different characteristics and ask (holding everything 
else constant) whether a being would be more valuable and precious if it 
had that characteristic or not. 
 
Nozick’s proposed valuable characteristics are: 
 
 free will 
 conscious [-ness] 
 self-conscious [-ness] 
 able to do something because its right  
 able to recognize value 
 able to guide behavior in accord with its recognition of value 
 self-choosing13
 
 These can be condensed into“...a value seeking self... [which has some 
significant degree of organic unity and hence of intrinsic value] in virtue of that 
(double) characteristic...” 14 
        
CONSCIENCE AS BRIDGE BETWEEN FACT AND VALUE 
 
 Modern evolutionary sociobiology has provided an important corrective to 
how we understand human motivational psychology--we are not, after all, 
motivated only by libido and aggression. Altruism is also motivational and also 
deeply ingrained (Ruse, 1993). Even with this corrective, we are left with the 
fairly commonplace idea that vice and virtue both reside in our nature while the 
knowledge of what constitutes vice and what constitutes virtue may not.   
 The questions “ What is nature vs. nurture?” has been supplanted by the 
dual questions “ What in our nurture becomes our nature?” and “What in our 
nature ought to be nurtured?” Moral developmental psychology alone is (and 
should be?) mute on this subject. However, we are at least tempted to say that 
the perspective of moral developmental psychology does seem to point beyond 
itself to a version of naturalism, allowing for the existence of diverse trajectories 
within each domain of conscience development. Such a version of naturalism 
would be compatible with some forms of both utilitarian and deontological, as 
well as, virtue ethics but would not support the hegemony of any of these moral 
traditions {Consider also the tradition of prima facie duties--Ross}.  
 Beginning with conscience functioning (as distinct from development), on 
the other hand, seems at first to circumvent the difficulties with value laden 
developmental terminology. We can proceed to the domains of conscience 
without really answering the moral philosophical question“ Should one value 
each domain of conscience as much as every other (or, should one value any at 
all)?” Instead, a hypothetical condition is identified which precedes the question 
posed: “If the domains of conscience are themselves subject to a reflective, self-
subsuming valuational process, then what values and virtues are seen to arise in 
association with each domain?” The bedrock values arise only by valuing the 
conscience domains specified within the context of practicing the virtues 
associated with those same domains in a life lived in accordance with behavioral 
imperatives shaped and fitted to the virtues. Naturalistic fallacy (if it is a fallacy) 
may be averted. However there remains another difficulty: a pluralism of moral 
principles or prima facie duties.  
 
{Table II. 
 
Salient Domain Bedrock Value      
Conscience          
Functioning 
  
Ground:     Engagement            
Moral Aporia                      
 
Conceptualization                                              Meaning      
  
Moral Attachment                                              Connectedness      
   
Moral Emotional                                                Harmony    
Responsiveness                                                Balance 
               
Moral Volition                                                     Autonomy       
Moral Valuation                                                  Worth       
   
i) authority-derived                                              Continuity      
                                                       Tradition                
 
ii) self-derived                                                      Authenticity     
   
iii) peer/progeny                                                   Justice 
 derived                                           }  
 
 Does developmental psychology provide the means of resolving the 
pluralism in a way that functional psychology does not? That is, does a particular 
bedrock value become deeper, richer and more complex in the developmental 
process owing to how the domains of conscience and the bedrock values 
associated with them are yoked together? 
  It may be the case (susceptible of empirical validation?) that an 
individual’s progression in development in one conscience domain proceeds in 
concert with his/her progression in other domains, although his/her status in each 
domain may not begin or always remain evenly at the same level. Hence a 
domain may be, for some time, salient in the developmental process, and 
account for differences in conscience style, more or less suiting the different 
moral philosophies.15 Alternatively, by adapting a term applied by Nozick to 
values, we may speak of the uniquely individual contours of conscience. In the 
figure below, the density of color relates to the consolidation of development in a 
particular domain while the upper boundary identifies the salient of development 
according to stages. 
 
{Table III Conscience Contours 
 
   SCI Domains 
    CON   MER   V2   ATC   V1   MV   V3 
 
   (  ) 
 
 
 
   V                 x 
    x  x 
                                     x          x 
 
   SCI   IV                x    x 
   STAGES 
 
 
   III 
      
 
 
   II 
      
      
   I 
 
Figurative representation of a person who esteems reflectiveness, tradition and 
regard for others by practicing virtues of honesty in self examination, respect for 
authority in his/her chosen and assigned roles and fairness towards others but 
who has not as fully cultivated virtues corresponding to the values of balance and 
freedom and connectedness.                     }    
  
   In any event as the domains of moral development are explicated and 
empirically validated in normal and adverse circumstances, it becomes possible 
to see their connections to different moral philosophies that have come to 
dominate moral reasoning and discourse. We have today refinements of 
deontological, consequential (e.g.utilitarian), rights-based, entitlements-based 
and virtues-based ethics vying with egoism for pride of place in our ethical 
considerations {-if not our moral philosophies (for an examination of morality and 
moral philosophy vs. ethical considerations see Williams, 1985)}.  
 
[Inset 8:            DEONTOLOGY 
 
Moral theories according to which the rightness or  
obligatori-ness of an action is not exclusively determined 
by the value of its consequences.1
  
“ The end does not justify the means,” is a  
deontological expression.  
 
Some acts are right or wrong in themselves.  
To act rightly, agents must first of all refrain from  
doing things that are known to be, before    
the fact, wrong. The particular requirements  
are called, variously:  
 * rules 
 * laws 
 * deontological constraints 
 * prohibitions 
 * limitations 
 * proscriptions 
 * norms  
 Deontological constraints are  
 1) negatively formulated as “ Thou shalt not’s”  
 2) narrowly framed and bounded  
 3) narrowly directed, attaching to agent’s  
 decisions and actions rather than the  
 consequences of their choice or action 2  
 
 1. A DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY, T. Mautner (ed.)  
     Blackwell Publishers Inc.; Cambridge, Mass.,1996. 
 2. Davis, N.  (1993): Contemporary deontology. In: 
     A COMPANION TO ETHICS, P. Singer (ed.)  
     Blackwell Publishers Inc., pp. 205--218.  
 Also see: 
 Rawls, J. (1971): A THEORY OF JUSTICE.  
 The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press;  
 Cambridge, Massachucetts.                                                                   ] 
 
 
[Inset 9:  CONSEQUENTIALISM 
      (OLDER TERM: TELEOLOGY) 
 
 The view that whatever values an individual or  
 institutional agent adopts, the proper response to  
 those values is to promote them.1
 
 Consequences alone should be taken into account  
 when making judgments about right and wrong. 2
 
 
 
 Some Types: 
 
 Some identify utilitarianism with consequentialism;  
 some say it  is a kind of consequentialism; some say  
 the term ‘utilitarianism’ should be reserved for  
 consequentialism with the assumption that only   
 pleasure (alternatively: well-being or preference  
 satisfaction) has  intrinsic value. Some advise 
 that the distinctions should be ‘utilitarian vs .  
 non-utilitarian’ and ‘consequentialist vs.  
 nonconsequentialist.’3
 
  Hence deontology is nonconsequentialist,  
 virtue-based ethics are consequentialist  
 (invoke teleology) but may or may not have a utilitarian  
 component.   
 
 1. Pettit, P. (1993): Consequentialism. In: A COMPANION  
     TO ETHICS, P. Singer (ed.) Blackwell Publishers Inc.,  
     pp.230-240. 
 2,3. A DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY, T. Mautner (ed.)  
     Blackwell Publishers Inc.; Cambridge, Mass., 1996.                             
                                 ]                                               
 
 
` [Inset 10:        VIRTUE  ETHICS 
 
 Ethical theory in which the concept of virtue is fundamental,  
           in contrast to rule- or duty- based moral theories.1
 
 Also uses terms such as ‘integrity’ or ‘character’. What does  
 a good person do in real life situations?  
 The Virtue-theorist does not necessarily reject utilitarianism  
 or rights-based theories, but believes these theories ignore  
 ordinary moral life involving character. 2 
  
 SOME TYPES: 
 
 Medicine has a moral tradition in which physicians' lives  
 can achieve a certain unity or ‘narrative’. They can look  
 backwards (and forward) and see how their lives made  
 (make) a difference. Moreover, medicine has its internal  
 ‘practices’ which allow for intrinsic pleasure 
 beyond its extrinsic rewards: the deft surgical hand,  
 the perspicacious diagnosis, the esteem of a great  
 teacher by students....3   
  
 Contemporary representatives: Elizabeth Anscombe,  
 Alasdair MacIntyre, Phillipa Foot. 
 
 1. A DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY, T. Mautner (ed.)  
     Blackwell Publishers Inc.; Cambridge, Mass.,1996. 
 2,3. Pence, G. (1993): Virtue Theory.In:  
     A COMPANION TO ETHICS, P. Singer (ed.)  
     Blackwell Publishers Inc., pp. 249-258.  
 Also see: 
 MacIntyre, A. (1984): AFTER VIRTUE, second edition.  
 University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana.                              ] 
     
 The correlation of bedrock values with salient domains of conscience 
affords a new perspective on and new insight into the developmental 
psychological origins of the great moral philosophies.  Table IV was derived 
intuitively and is proposed tentatively in recognition that the moral philosophies, 
having been shaped by human beings, are subject to the influences of their 
individual, developmental trajectories in the domains of moral psychology.   
  
{Table IV Conscience Domains, Intrinsic Values & 
 Moral Philosophical Traditions 
 
Salient Domain Bedrock Value Moral Philosophies      
Conscience      (historical precursors)       
Functioning 
  
Ground:   Engagement               *           
Moral Aporia                      
 
Conceptualization Meaning  Socratism, Platonism, 
               Stoicism      
  
Moral Attachment  Connectedness Communitarian      
   
Moral Emotional Harmony  Virtue-based Ethics    
Responsiveness Balance  (Nicomachean Ethics) 
     Care-based ethics     
 
Moral Volition Individuality  Libertarianism     
     Existentialism 
 
Moral Valuation Worth  Teleology or  
     Consequentialism 
        
i) authority-derived Continuity  Authoritarianism                               
Tradition      Covenatal ethics            
 
ii) self-derived Authenticity  Egoist ethics 
      Enlightened    
     Self-Interest 
 
 
iii) peer/progeny                 Justice  Contractarian Ethics 
    derived                                              }  
        
 
 
  
 The in-depth critique of any particular representative of a philosophical 
tradition would proceed with an appreciation that much more complexity is 
involved. For example, in associating an Aristotelian virtue based ethics with the 
bedrock value of Harmony or Balance, originally associated with the domain of 
moral emotional responsiveness, other rough correspondences among the 
domains of conscience and this moral philosophy should not be ignored.17 
 As a search of the index to various histories of philosophy (Coppleston, 
eight volumes published between 1946-1974 new edition 1993; Jones, five 
volumes published between 1952-1980) will convince the reader, in spite of 
various emphases on the Good, Well-being and Virtue, conscience as a core 
concept (or even as an auxiliary concept worthy of explication) seldom appears 
in anyone’s philosophy, at least by the name of conscience. Exceptions include 
Ockham who uses the word ‘conscience’ in connection with the Scholastic 
concept of ‘right reason’ (in turn, derived from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics) 
and espouses the doctrine that one is morally obliged to follow one’s conscience 
even if it is “invincibly erroneous” (Coppleston, 1993). In the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, conscience is given much more consideration in the form of 
moral sense beginning with The Earl of Shaftesbury and continuing with 
Hucheson, Bishop Butler, Hume and Adam Smith. In the latter there emerges an 
emphasis upon sympathy, what today would be called empathy.18 In Smith there 
is a singular emphasis upon this moral emotion (sentiment).  
 The libertarian view represented by Nozick (1981) envisions the tasks of 
ethical theory to demarcate both moral push and pull. Ethical theory must show 
and explain why and how the value of a person gives rise to determinate 
conditions, to moral constraints upon the behavior of others; ethical theory must 
also show and explain why and how a person whose life befits his own value will 
(thereby) be led to behave toward others in specified ways, why and how a 
person is better off behaving morally towards others--in accordance with their 
moral pull.... 19 As in previous cases,  rough correspondences may be drawn 
between each conscience domain and  various elements of Nozick’s theory of 
value. However, what appears to us salient in that theory are the bedrock values 
of FREEDOM, MEANING and VALUE, itself, associated respectively with the 
conscience domains of moral volition, conceptualization, and valuation.  
 Similarly, a complete moral developmental critique of the early 
existentialist writings on ethics of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche would seek to 
identify how development in each conscience domain is represented in the 
corpus of his philosophy even if the bedrock values associated with some 
domain(s), again volition and valuation but notably not conceptualization, are 
emphasized at the expense of the others. Kierkegaard emphasizes radical 
individuality (although he allows that each individual is both personal self and the 
human race (self derived valuation is also salient in Kierkegaard/Climacus’ first 
dialectical movement that subjectivity (inwardness) is the truth. However, 
Kierkegaard’s work with respect to conscience, probably has most contributory 
value in his critique of Hegel’s teaching on the same subject and most originative 
value in his exegetical account of Abraham and Isaac and the concept of the 
teleological suspension of the ethical).   
  Nietzsche, however, presents a radically different volitional/valuational 
alternative to choosing conscience (which he repudiates): 20
 
 [Inset 11:  NIETSZCHE’S PICTURE OF CONSCIENCE 
 
I take bad conscience to be a deep seated malady to which man 
succumbed under the pressure of the most profound transformation he 
ever underwent--the one that made him once and for all a sociable and 
pacific creature.... All instincts that are not allowed freeplay turn inward. 
This is what I call man’s interiorization; it alone provides the soil for the 
growth of what is later called man’s soul.... The formidable bulwarks by 
means of which the polity protected itself against the ancient instincts of 
freedom...caused those wild, extravagant instincts to turn in upon man. 
Hostility, cruelty, the delight in persecution, raids, excitement, destruction, 
all turned against their begetter.... Man, with his need for self-torture, his 
sublimated cruelty resulting from the cooping-up of his animal nature 
within a polity, invented bad conscience in order to hurt himself, after the 
blocking of the more natural outlet of his cruelty. 
 
Friedrich Nietzsche,  
from THE GENEALOGY OF  MORALS                                                   ] 
 
 In the Table V, we have identified associated virtues. The relationship of 
value to virtue requires some clarification. According to MacIntyre (1984): as a 
first stage in definition 
 
  A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession  
  and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those  
  goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which  
  effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.21
 
PRACTICE had previously been defined as 
 
  ...any coherent and complex form of socially established 
  cooperative human activity through which goods internal to  
  that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to 
  achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate  
  to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the  
  result that human powers to achieve excellence and human  
  conceptions of the ends and goods involved are systematically  
  extended... 22
 
 
EXTERNAL GOODS have the characteristics 
 
  ...that when achieved they are always some individual’s  
  property and possession... [and] that the more someone has of  
  them, the less there is for other people.....23
 
INTERNAL GOODS are 
 
  ...good for the whole community who participate in  
  the practice... 24  
 
On MacIntyre’s view, virtues are to be found in the context of practices which 
occur in the unity of life and tradition: 
 
The unity of a human life is the unity of a narrative quest...which is always an 
education both as to the character of what is sought and in self knowledge. The 
virtues are therefore to be understood as those dispositions which not only 
sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goods internal to practices, but 
which will also sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the good, by enabling 
us to overcome the harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which we 
encounter, and which will furnish us with increasing self-knowledge and 
increasing of the good.... 25
 
{Table V Conscience Domains, Intrinsic Values, Associated Virtues & 
               Moral Philosophical Traditions 
 
Salient Conscience Bedrock Value  Associated  Moral Philosophy 
     Domain        Virtues  (historical precursors) 
 
Ground : 
Moral Aporia  Engagement  capacity for wonder pre-philosophical 
      piety 
      humility 
 
Conceptualization Meaning  inquisitiveness  Socratism, 
      Truth   Platonism, 
         Stoicism 
 
Moral Attachment Connectedness  loyalty   Communitarian 
      mutuality 
      tolerance 
 
Moral Emotional Harmony  moderaton  Virtue-based Ethics 
Responsiveness Individuality  empathy  (Nicomachean Ethics) 
      compassion  Care-based ethics 
 
Moral Volition  Individuality  respect for   Libertarianism 
      freedom  Existentialism 
      creativity 
 
Moral Valuation  Worth   purposive direction Teleology or  
      Virtue   Consequentialism 
 
  i) authority derived Continuity  respect for   Authoritarianism 
   Tradition  authority  Covenental Ethics 
 
 ii) self derived  Authenticity  self respect  Egoistic Ethics 
      inwardness             Enlightened Self-Interest 
 
iii) peer/progeny  Justice   impartiality  Contractarian Ethics 
 derived                     } 
 
          
 The completed table also exposes the developmental roots, in the 
domains of conscience, of moral (right v right) dilemmas recently identified in  
dichotomous fashion by Kidder(1995): 
         
[Inset 12:                      KIDDER’S MORAL DILEMMAS 
 
TRUTH VS. LOYALTY 
INDIVIDUAL VS. COMMUNITY 
SHORT TERM VS. LONGTERM 
JUSTICE VS. MERCY 
 
 
  Kidder, R. (1995): HOW GOOD PEOPLE  
  MAKE TOUGH CHOICES.  
  Fireside/ Simon and Schuster; New York.                    ]                              
     
 
However, it is also apparent from Table V that dichotomous treatment of moral 
issues does not do justice to the moral aporia with which human beings must 
contend and the moral adventure upon which they may embark. In fact there are 
not simply di- but also tri- and quadri- (and even more) lemmas to recognize. 
That is, any of the bedrock values may be emphasized to the apparent detriment 
of not just one but any and all of the others and subserve a person’s being, in a 
specifiable way, “virtuous to a fault.”  
 
 A CONSCIENCE CENTERED THEORY OF (MEDICAL) ETHICS 
  
 While still evolving, our conscience-centered theory of ethics begins with 
the following propositions: 
 
  1. Valuation exists.  
  2. Valuation has intrinsic value. 
  3. Valuation does not exist without attachment, cognition, emotion 
  and volition, hence these too, must have at least instrumental 
  (more probably intrinsic and, possibly in the case of volition,  
  originative) value. 
  4. Conscience formation is one means by which an organic  
                unity of these developmental domains is attained, in virtue of  
      which they are said to be moralized. 
  5. Choosing a life with conscience has intrinsic  
                (originative?) value in virtue of which each of the other  
      domains has intrinsic (bedrock) value. Hence the choice of 
                conscience involves accepting certain values which govern, but  
                 in turn are shaped by, the practice of virtues. 
  6. These values are: meaning, connectedness, harmony,  
      autonomy, and goodness.26 
 
   To say so much is to accept that the term naturalistic can be applied to 
our conscience-centered theory of ethics, but only if the bridge of conscience is 
chosen as a construct between fact and value. A conscience-centered theory of 
ethics can be counted among the pluralistic ethics. It imposes some constraints 
on relativism but does not (and does not seek to) eliminate it. We would agree 
with David Wong in his assessment: 
  
... if human nature has a definite structure, one would expect further 
constraining conditions on an adequate morality to derive from our nature. 
But the complexity of our nature makes it possible for us to prize a variety 
of goods and to order them in different ways, and this opens the way for a 
substantial relativism to be true.... Wong, 1993) 
     
 Moral adventure requires taking risks by adopting perspectives without 
unnecessary exclusiveness. It requires openness to moral discourse; but it does 
not require losing oneself in the process. An individual adopting a conscience 
centered ethic, will understand that virtuous practice is always in one’s own 
socio-cultural and temporal context but that the context changes and can be 
changed through, among other things, advocacy perhaps stimulated by cross 
cultural contact bridging space or historical understanding bridging time (see 
Williams, 1985 also cited in endnote #18). Fostering optimal development of 
conceptualization of conscience, moral attachment, moral emotional 
responsiveness, moral valuation and moral volition in oneself and others is the 
moral adventure in terms of developmental domains. Balancing connectedness, 
individuality, continuity, authenticity and the Golden Rule is the moral adventure 
in terms of bedrock values. Freedom, tolerance, respect for and duty towards 
authority, self and others must be justly and compassionately moderated. That is 
the moral adventure in terms of virtues. The integration of moral philosophical 
principles and methods of discourse with moral imagination (cf. Johnson, 1993) 
is the moral adventure in philosophical terms. 27
 If we choose to nurture and protect that part of our nature we call 
conscience, then there are boundary conditions we accept, in virtue of our 
choice, determining which and, also, how bridges will be constructed over the 
gap between fact and value. These conditions specify a limited plurality of 
intrinsic values, one associated with each domain of conscience. Corresponding 
to the plurality of values there is a somewhat less limited plurality of prima facie 
duties and virtues, the unity or reconciliation of which (or, alternatively, the 
holding of both in creative tension) is an open question for each person until 
his/her life story is finally told.     
     
V. FROM MORAL PHILOSOPHY TO MEDICAL ETHICS. 
 
 The moral philosophies are acknowledged for their powerful influence in 
shaping Medical Ethics (Pellegrino, 1993): 
 
Current proposals for moral legitimation- such as physician-assisted 
suicide, voluntary and even involuntary euthanasia, health care rationing, 
the buying and selling of organs for transplantation, or the renting of 
uterus, ova, and sperm- each has a rationalization deeply rooted in some 
conceptual shift in moral theory....  
 
  It is possible to explore and critique a medical ethical argument or 
proposal from a developmental psychological point of view, albeit indirectly, 
through such a critique of the moral theory in which it is rooted, or with the 
fundamental values and virtues associated with the moral theory.  
   How do those principles that have been hitherto identified with medical 
ethics (Pellegrino, 1993)- 
            
 BENEFICENCE,  
 NONMALEFICENCE,  
 AUTONOMY and  
 JUSTICE 
 
- relate to the conscience domains?  AUTONOMY is a medical ethical principle 
having to do with respecting the patient’s choices, justice with uneven distribution 
of health care. Autonomy appears connected with the domain of MORAL 
VOLITION; JUSTICE with the domain of VALUATION. But what of 
BENEFICENCE (intend good) and NON-MALEFICENCE (do no harm)? These 
seem overarching, requiring evenly hovering attention to each and every bedrock 
value of conscience. And yet there may be even more involved in accepting the 
role of healer. Are there healing values and virtues that are articulated from each 
bedrock value of conscience linked to each moral developmental domain as well 
as those that have been hitherto identified with medical ethics? ADVANCING 
KNOWLEDGE, in oneself and in one’s patient, seems to be a principle derived 
from the bedrock value associated with the Conscience domain of 
CONCEPTUALIZATION. Adherence to this principle empowers both health care 
provider and patient to share decision-making. Psycho-educational interventions 
and the process of informed consent as well as continuing medical education 
might be governed by this principle.   
 STRENGTHENING CONNECTIONS within the various communities in 
which the patient lives and upon which he/she depends: familial and extra-
familial- particularly the medical community (including medical care case 
managers), seems to correspond to Moral Attachment. Accepting and seeking 
supervision, patient care monitoring, curbside and more formal second opinions, 
interdisciplinary treatment planning and networking among service providers as 
well as collateral contacts with family members and referrals to support groups 
might be governed by this principle.  
 Cultivation of professional MORAL EMOTIONAL RESPONSIVENESS: 
interest in patients, empathic responsiveness to them, adaptive handling of 
disgust, anger, fear as well as professional pride and guilt, are examples.  
 While AUTONOMY is readily identified with MORAL VOLITION, MORAL 
VOLITION is an overarching domain in which development proceeds from the 
stage of autonomy to industry, efficacy, agency and finally advocacy. As a 
principle, MORAL VOLITION seems to govern both the health care provider and 
the patient. Are expectations of the health care provider appropriate? To what 
extent does Aesculapian or, simply, sapiential authority, undeniably diminished in 
our era, deserve respect as a potential source of AUTHORITY-DERIVED 
VALUATION?  When such authority is invoked, is there appropriate 
circumspection regarding its limitations?  Is such authority recognized as the 
basis for setting limits to what the health care provider can do or should be asked 
to do either by the patient or by third party payors through managed care?  
 The patient’s responsibility for him/herself (dovetailing with the domain of 
SELF-DERIVED VALUATION) is the other side of his/her freedom. Perhaps the 
health care provider’s role is governed by the principle of beneficence when the 
patient’s healing is seen in the overall context of the person’s flourishing, and by 
the principle of non-malificence when flourishing is not threatened by either the 
effort to heal or the limits placed upon the mode of healing by the autonomous 
functioning of the patient or the agent of managed care.  
 The health care providers willingness to participate in health care reform is 
governed by JUSTICE and strongly related to PEER/PROGENY-DERIVED 
VALUATION. In justice we see the melding of advocacy, as the terminus of the 
developmental trajectory from autonomy, and peer derived valuation. 
    
VI. THE HEALTH PROFESSIONAL’S CONSCIENCE. 
  
 In summary, by examining the roots of medical ethics in moral 
development indirectly via moral theory or directly via bedrock values associated 
with conscience domains, in addition to beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy 
and justice, we can provisionally expand the list of principles for medical ethics to 
include advancing knowledge, strengthening connections, and cultivating moral 
emotional responsiveness. It remains to be seen (do we undertake this 
research?) 28 whether and how these particular values acquire any sort of 
strength in the course of professional education and to what extent they are 
accompanied by changes in their associated conscience domains. Does it even 
make sense to speak of a professional conscience as something derived but 
distinct from conscience as we have identified it? Is the health professional’s 
conscience simply a conscience that has assimilated the health profession’s 
standards and ethic, based upon biomedical principlism as an iterative process in 
the domain of moral authority derived valuation?  Or does each conscience 
domain undergo transformation such that it becomes distinctly professional? 
While Dr. Every Person lets her conscience be her guide as she practices her 
chosen profession, does she--and how does she--also guide her conscience 
according to that profession and advocate for changes in the institutions that 
bear it?  
                                            AN ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 
           FOR THOSE IN THE HEALING PROFESSIONS 
 
ACT (TREAT, TEACH, STUDY AND LEARN) 
 IN SUCH A WAY THAT   
NURTURES AND PROTECTS CONSCIENCE  
IN ONESELF AND OTHERS. 
 
    
Endnotes 
 
1. Aesthetic, moral, and religious development are proper subjects for 
psychological study so long as the science involved is not confounded with either 
the investigators’ aesthetic ideal(s), moral philosophy(ies), or religious 
persuasion(s). With regard to the study of conscience development and 
functioning, we do not presume to argue from observations, analyses and 
interpretations of data (i.e. from what appears to be the case) to what ought to 
be. In philosophy, such arguments are considered flawed, subject as they are to 
what is termed the naturalistic fallacy. The study of human sexuality does not in 
itself tell us how to value human sexuality. Analogously, neither does the study of 
human conscience tell us how to value human conscience. Yet each of the 
investigators, each of the subjects, and each of the subjects’ parents in the 
Stilwell Conscience Study considered it valuable enough to participate. So we 
who have participated in the scientific study of conscience are not dirempt of 
values either at the front end in choosing to participate in the study or at the back 
end in choosing how to use the results. Like it or not, in between the front end 
and the back end, values were ever operating as we chose what to pay attention 
to the most and how we framed the experience of our data.  
 Turnabout is fair play. Having said that moral and religious development 
are proper subjects for psychological study, it is incumbent upon us to note that  
the psychological understanding of moral or religious development  may properly 
be viewed in both the context of moral philosophy and religion.  
 
  This fundamental point is not just applicable to research.  Those of us 
who conduct therapy recognize that while we may strive to be “nonjudgmental” in 
our approach to patients, the very act of adopting a nonjudgmental attitude is the 
outcome of a judgment made on the basis of a healing value. The therapist trusts 
in the processes of growth and development; when those processes are 
impaired, in healing; and as those processes resume, in the prospect of human 
flourishing. Moreover, the therapist who is governed by healing values is curious 
about all that is encompassed by the human experience: aesthetic, moral, and 
religious no less than psychosexual development. We do not escape, indeed we 
embrace, values in therapy which, for example help a person reframe 
experiences (i.e. explore how she can value differently, or find a different moral in 
her story) in such a way that provides more meaning and supports more adaptive 
functioning. To be sure, healing values are even present in making a biological 
intervention. The expectation that medication will confer benefit without 
unacceptable side effects is a value shaped expectation in ongoing 
pharmacotherapy. This is particularly true when the therapeutic effect and the 
side effect are as subtly different but as closely linked as two sides to the same 
coin: “ Doctor, the Prozac really has helped my depression but I don’t like the 
way it dampens some of my emotional responses.”   
  
2. Jones, W.T. (1980) A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY IV: KANT AND 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY,  second edition, revised. Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich College Publishers, Ft Worth. pp. 14-15. 
 
3. Ibid., introduction xx. 
 
4. Ibid., pp. 20-21.  
 
5. Ibid., pp. 65-68. Kant drew a distinction between what is within and what is 
beyond the spatiotemporal manifold, as opposed to drawing a distinction along 
substantival lines such as Descartes had done. This allowed him to consider the 
(noumenal) self beyond knowledge which is limited to what is within the 
spatiotemporal world, and  allowed for the possibility of agency, inter alia, as 
regulative of empirical inquiry. Also see pp.107-108: Jones points out that much 
of subsequent philosophy has followed one or another pathway out of the 
Kantian paradigm with respect to theories of knowledge, some denying the 
existence of noumena, altogether, others opposing Kant’s view that the mind has 
no access to noumena either by reason (e.g. Hegel’s dialectic) or intuitively (e.g. 
Schopenauer). 
 
6. Kant, I. translated by H.J. Paton (1964): GROUNDWORK OF THE 
METAPHYSIC OF MORALS,  Harper and Row, New York, p.96. 
 
7. Elkind, D. (1980) Developmental Structuralism of Jean Piaget. In: THE 
COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY III  (H. Kaplan, A. Freedman  
&  B. Sadock, eds). Williams and Wilkins, Baltimore, p. 374: 
 
In his CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, Kant argued that reason is not pure 
because it requires experience but always categorizes it, so one can 
never know it in the raw. Thus Kant saw that all human knowledge bears 
the imprint of human knowing. But the imprint that Kant perceived was 
dictated by the physics and mathematics of his time. He mistook some of 
what was known for categories of knowing. He had no method, other than 
reflection, for separating the knowing process from the content known. 
Piaget, by creating ...an experimental epistemology... was able to arrive at 
an empirical separation between the processes of knowing and the 
content known.... He was able to separate out what was contributed by the 
child from what was contributed by experience in a more exact way than 
Kant was able to.... Structuralism ...permits new reorganizations and new 
knowledge and is, therefore more flexible and open than the Kantian 
categories.... 
 
8. For an overview of these issues see: Overton, W. & Horowitz, H. (1991): 
Developmental psychopathology: integrations and differentiations. In: 
ROCHESTER SYMPOSIUM ON DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY-
MODELS OF INTEGRATION  (ed. D. Cicchetti & S. Toth), University of 
Rochester Press. pp. 1-42. The following precis is offered: 
 
Levels of knowing are identified first: these are theory, metatheory, 
empirical scientific demarcationist strategies and epistemology. Stations of 
knowing are dealt with in an historic context. There are the realist-
objectivist stations, the first of which claims that knowledge is independent 
of the knower with the associated demarcationist strategy being called 
positivism - to be scientific any explanatory statement must be an 
empirical generalization induced directly from observation, and 
demonstrably capable of being directly reducible to observation. A second 
station is historical realism which is more of a convergence theory of 
knowing, accepting that observation is clouded by illusion, rumor and 
prejudice, but claiming that the tools of logic and passage of time will allow 
reality  and illusion to be sorted out. There are rationalist stations, which 
reject realism in favor of understanding that all human knowledge derives 
from the activity of interpretation. This leads to a cycle of choices between 
skepticism (complete uncertainty of all knowledge) and dogmatism 
(marked by the belief that there must be some omniscient source of truth 
outside human interpretation). Associated with this station is the strategy 
attributed to Norwood Hanson: all data is thought of as “theory laden”, 
science involves discerning patterns rather than observing cause-effect 
sequences. Such things as mental structures, schemata, ego and 
dynamisms could be treated as legitimate scientific explanation. Kuhn’s 
famous treatise on the Structure of Scientific Revolutions is cited as an 
elaboration of this station. The post skeptical rationalist station shares with 
other stations of science the aim of discovering a coherent system of 
understanding that will introduce an order and organization into the world, 
and this is brought about by explanation which moves from the manifest 
man-in-the-world to the scientific man-in-the-world, from the prevalent folk 
psychology to critical formal psychology. What is different at this station is 
a rejection of complete reliance upon reductionistic explanation. Rather, 
order is brought into the manifest world by constructing abstract, 
normative patterns that plausibly, intelligibly and coherently systematize 
the domain of inquiry.  These patterns originate in abductive or 
retroductive inference processes, which originate in metaphor and 
metatheoretical assumptions. Causal laws, or general antecedent-
consequent functional relations become formulated within, and derive their 
meaning from, the pattern context. Testing proceeds according to criteria 
including scope of application, depth, logical consistency, fruitfulness, 
viability and empirical support. Absolute fixed knowledge is not possible 
but coherent, relatively stable, broadly applicable knowledge is a 
warranted and attainable goal. Demanded is a delicate balance and 
dialectical tension between the conceptual and empirical, interpretation 
and observation, theory and research method. Bowlby and attachment 
theorists/researchers are offered as the best contemporary examples.  
 
For an earlier account of the conflict among  --what are termed above as--
metatheoretical and demarcationist strategies and its effect on psychology, see 
J. Rychlak (1988): THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RADICAL HUMANISM.   
 9. While our remark about Piaget anticipating game theory is somewhat 
facetious, there is an interesting relationship between morality and game theory 
described in the moral philosophical literature. See, for example, MacIntyre, A. 
AFTER VIRTUE second edition, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 
Indiana, p. 97ff: The author has been discussing the character of generalizations 
in social science and their lack of predictive power and sources of unpredictability 
in human affairs: 
 
...to some theorists in political science the formal structures of game 
theory have served to provide  a possible basis for explanatory and 
predictive theory  incorporating law like generalizations. Take the formal 
structure of an n-person game, identify the relevant interests of the players 
in some empirical situation and we shall at the very least be able to predict 
what alliances and coalitions a fully rational player will enter into and ...the 
pressures upon and the subsequent behavior of not fully rational 
players.... Consider three types of obstacle to the transfer of the formal 
structure of game theory to actual social and political situations. The first 
concerns the indefinite reflexivity of game theoretic situations. I am trying 
to predict what move you will make; in order to predict this I must predict 
what you will predict as to what move I will make.... and so on. At each 
stage each of us will simultaneously be trying to render himself, or herself, 
unpredictable by the other; and each of us will also be relying on the 
knowledge that the other will be trying to make himself or herself 
unpredictable in forming his or her predictions.... [A second obstacle is 
that ] game theoretic situations are characteristically situations of 
imperfect knowledge... it is a major interest of each actor to maximize the 
imperfection of the information of certain other actors at the same time as 
he improves his own.... [The third obstacle is that] in any given social 
interaction it is frequently the case that many different transactions are 
taking place at one and the same time between members of the same 
group. Not one game is being played, but several, and if the game 
metaphor may be stretched further, the problem about real life is that 
moving one’s knight to QB3 may always be replied to with a lob across the 
net.  
  
MacIntyre., p104, subsequently writes : 
 
Each of us, individually and as a member of particular social groups, 
seeks to embody his own plans and projects in the natural and social 
world. A condition of achieving this is to render as much as possible of 
both natural and social environment as possible predictable and the 
importance of both natural and social science in our lives derives at least 
in part -although only in part- from their contribution to this project. At the 
same time each of us, individually and as a member of particular social 
groups, aspires to preserve his independence, his freedom, his creativity, 
and that inner reflection which plays so great a part in freedom and 
creativity, from invasion by others.... We need to remain to some degree 
opaque and unpredictable, particularly when threatened by the predictive 
practices of others.... 
 
In contrast see: Nozick,R.(1981): PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS, The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. p.577 ff. regarding 
a meaningful life as one lived transparently. 
 
10. Hansen, C. (1993): Classical Chinese ethics. In: A COMPANION TO ETHICS  
(ed. P. Singer). Blackwell Publishers Ltd., Oxford, UK. pp. 74-75.  
     For an excellent comparison and contrast of Western and early Buddhist 
moral philosophical traditions see: Kalupahana, D.J. (1995): ETHICS IN EARLY 
BUDDHISM. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu. 
 
11. Nozick, pp. 418-422.  
 12. Hume, D. TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE, BOOK III,Part I, Sec. I. cited in 
Nozick, pp.399-400n. 
For basic orientation to the naturalistic fallacy and naturalism see: Pigden.C 
(1993): Naturalism. In: P. Singer, pp.421-431. 
For other commentaries on the subject, see: Williams, B. (1985): ETHICS AND 
THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, 
pp.128-131, and the following chapter. 
 
There are genuine ethical, and ultimately metaphysical, concerns 
underlying the worries about ought and is and the naturalistic fallacy. At 
the heart of them is an idea that our values are not “in the world”, that a 
properly untendentious description of the world would not mention any 
values, that our values are in some sense imposed or projected on our 
surroundings... 
 
If there is some fundamental distinction of fact and value, it is certainly not 
a universal feat of humanity to have recognized it--it is instead a 
discovery, an achievement of enlightenment. But then there is no reason 
to suppose that our ethical language, insofar as there is any such well-
defined thing, already presents the distinction to us. It may be that it does 
not present anything of the sort, either suggestive of such a distinction or 
concealing it: it may be a mistake to think that language can embody 
distinctively metaphysical beliefs... 
[T]hicker or more specific ethical notions such as treachery and promise  
and brutality  and courage seem to express a union of fact and value...The 
way these notions are applied is determined by what the world is like... 
their application usually involves a certain valuation of the situation, of 
persons or actions...Terms of this kind certainly do not lay bare the fact-
value distinction. Rather the theorist who wants to defend the distinction 
has to interpret the workings of these terms, and he does so by treating 
them as a conjunction of a factual and an evaluative element... 
 
These threads are taken up again on p. 141: 
  
Prescriptivism claims that what governs the application of a concept to the 
world is the descriptive element and...the evaluative element plays no 
part...  
Against this...there is no reason to believe that a descriptive equivalent will 
necessarily be available. How we “go on” from one application to another 
is a function of the kind of interest that the concept represents, and we 
should not assume that we could see how people “ go on” if we did not 
share the evaluative perspective in which this kind of concept has its point. 
 
After consideration and rejection of objectivist strategies that attempt via 
reflection to substitute knowledge for beliefs attained in unreflective practice, 
Williams turns his attention to the project of giving ethical life an objective and 
determinate grounding in considerations about human nature, representing the 
only intelligible form of ethical objectivity at the reflective level (p.152-153). His 
comments here are especially pertinent to our association of intrinsic, or bedrock, 
values  with the conscience domains, particularly if these are seen as  derived 
from those domains by a reflective, self-subsuming process of valuation.  
 
If the project succeeded, it would not simply be a matter of agreement on 
a theory of human nature. The convergence itself would be partly in social 
and psychological science, but what would matter would be a 
convergence to which scientific conclusions provided only part of the 
means. Nor, on the other hand, would there be a convergence directly on 
ethical truths, as in the other objectivist model. One ethical belief might be 
said to be in its own right an object of knowledge at the reflective level, to 
the effect that a certain kind of life was best for human beings. But this will 
not yield other ethical truths directly. The reason, to put it summarily, is 
that excellence or satisfactoriness of a life does not stand to beliefs 
involved in that life as premise stands to conclusion. Rather an agent‘s 
excellent life is characterized by having those beliefs, and most beliefs will 
not be about that agent’s disposition or life, or about other people’s 
dispositions, but about the social world. That life will involve, for instance, 
the agent’s using some thick concepts rather than others. Reflection on 
the excellence of a life does not itself establish the truth of judgments. 
Instead it shows that there is good reason ...to live a life that involves 
those concepts and those beliefs.... The objective grounding would not 
bring it about that the judgments using those concepts were true or could 
be known. But it would enable us to recognize that certain of them were 
the best or most appropriate thick concepts to use.... 
 This would be a structure very different from that of the objectivity 
of science. There would be a radical difference between ethics and 
science, even if ethics were objective in the only way in which it intelligibly 
could be. However, this does not mean that there is a clear distinction 
between (any) fact and (any) value; nor does it mean that there is no 
ethical knowledge. There is some, and in the less reflective past there has 
been more....   
 
cf. Nozick, p. 535: 
 
There are two famous chasms in ethics that despite determined efforts no 
one has been able to leap across or bridge: the one between the is and 
the ought (fact and value) and that (within the ought) between moral form 
and moral content. 
 
While, on Nozick’s view, the chasm cannot be bridged, he suggests several 
possibilities for avoiding it: 
 
 (1) Values enter into the very definition of what a fact is; the realm of facts  
 cannot be defined or specified without utilizing certain values. 
 (2) Values enter into the process of knowing a fact; without utilizing or  
 presupposing certain values, we cannot determine which is the realm of 
 facts, we cannot know the real from the unreal. If certain values are  
 embodied in our procedures for telling the real from the unreal, the facts  
 from the unfacts, then it is impossible to stand firmly on the fact side of the 
 fact-value distinction, while treating the other side as vaporous. 
 (3) The same processes or principles that carve facts out of the  
 undifferentiated, unconceptualized stuff also carve out values.... 
 
Nozick sees this process as a “deep cognitive psychological” one. That it is a 
deep psychological process we do not dispute. However to describe it as 
cognitive is unfortunately reductionistic. Instead it is a valuational process. He 
continues (p. 537): 
 
 
Yet another theoretical possibility accepts these chasms as real and wide; 
it tries to explain why they hold, perhaps hoping that the explanation of the 
chasms...might help us across. 
 
and on p.539 proceeds to argue that the is-ought or fact-value gap arises in the 
course of taking ethical truths seriously, looking for deeper explanatory truths: 
 
If explanation involves a derivation...of what is to be explained from what 
does the explaining, then this last mode of explanation requires that an 
ought be derived from an is. Note that this issue and problem does not 
depend on trying to justify or convince someone of an ethical statement. 
The task is not to provide agreement that the ethical statement is true, but 
rather to understand why it is true. 
 
There follows the statement (p.541): 
 Furthermore, we might especially hope to find [an explanatory principle] so 
deep that it subsumes and thereby explains itself... 
 
It is not until Nozick revisits the issue on pp.568-570, that we are given more 
details: 
 
 Given the choice that there be value, against the premiss that value exists, 
 what is the relationship of value to fact? Are some facts, the organically  
 unified ones, then identical with value(s)? I want to say: the relationship is  
 organic unity --values are organically related to (some) facts.... The choice 
 that there be value brings (some) facts into an organic relationship with  
 value, unifying these but not identifying them... 
 The gap between fact and value, bridged but not erased by our reflexive  
 choice that there be value, should not be viewed as wholly negative.  
 Though this gap allows some to deny the existence of value, it bars  
 reductionist denigrations of value, which see it as nothing but something  
 lesser....  
  
Here we come upon the foundation, the bridgehead, for asserting that 
conscience is the bridge between fact and value. But the strange loops of 
conscience also bridge between cognition in general, attachment, affect, volition 
and valuation. 
 
Finally, cf. MacIntyre, pp. 57-58: 
 
[Some later moral] philosophers have suggested , in an argument in which 
any attempt is made to derive a moral or evaluative conclusion from 
factual premises something which is not in the premises, namely the moral 
or evaluative element, will appear in the conclusion. Hence any such 
argument will fail. Yet in fact the alleged unrestrictedly general logical 
principle on which everything is being made to depend is bogus--and the 
scholastic tag applies only to Aristotelian syllogisms. There are several 
types of valid argument in which some element may appear in the 
conclusion which is not in the premises.... from the premise ‘He is a sea 
captain,’ the conclusion may be validly inferred ‘He ought to do what a sea 
captain ought to do.’... an ‘is’ premise can on occasion entail an ‘ought’ 
conclusion. Yet [the] claim [of adherents of the ‘no “ ought” from “ is” view’] 
may still have substance, but a substance that derives from a particular, 
and in the eighteenth century new, conception of moral rules and 
judgments. It may, that is, assert a principle whose validity derives not 
from a general logical principle, but from the meaning of the key terms 
employed. Suppose that during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
the meaning and implications of the key terms used in moral utterance 
had changed their character; it could then turn out to be the case that what 
had once been valid inferences from or to some particular moral premise 
or conclusion would no longer be valid or to what seemed to be the same 
factual premise or moral conclusion.... 
 
 MacIntyre proceeds to argue that there is validity in arguing from facts to 
values when the concept is functional. As examples he identifies  ‘watch’ and  
‘farmer’ as concepts defined by purpose or function such that one can validly 
conclude that x watch or y farmer is a good watch or farmer because it or s/he 
fulfills the purpose. He then asserts: 
 
...moral arguments within the classical Aristotelian tradition... involve at 
least one central functional concept, the concept of man having an 
essential nature and an essential purpose or function; and it is when and 
only when the classical tradition in its integrity has been substantially 
rejected that moral arguments change their character so that they fall 
within the scope of some version of the ‘No “ought” conclusion from “is” 
premise’ principle.   
      
13. Nozick, p.445. 
 
14. Nozick, p.457. 
 
15. In the conscience study, we have identified stages of conscience 
development and domains of conscience functioning. Within a given stage, 
among the different domains, there is considerable room for diversity and 
individuality. The within-stage varieties of moral experience and expression might 
best be subsumed by the term conscience styles or conscience contours. We 
have not made a formal study of conscience styles or contours although the 
composition of some stages in conceptualization of conscience is the first 
indication that they are there. For example, we found both a brain/mind and a 
heart conscience at Stage II, both a symbolic and a personified conscience at 
Stage III. Perhaps the next approximation of conscience styles is to be found in 
understanding the prominence of one or more domains of conscience functioning 
over the other domains in a particular person. The role of temperament in the 
contouring of conscience has been described best by Kochanska (see 
references). For a discussion of the desiderata of diversity  in moral philosophy  
see :  
Rorty, A. (1993): What it takes to be good, moral systems as practical directives 
for character formation. In : THE MORAL SELF   (ed.  G. Noam & T. Wren) MIT 
Press, Cambridge, Mass.  
Also cf. Nozick, pp. 446-450: 
 
Values are organic unities; something is intrinsically valuable in 
accordance with its degree of organic unity. However it does not follow 
that the realm of values itself exhibits high organic unity that diverse and 
apparently conflicting values can be united in some higher unity or larger 
harmony. The theme of the ineradicable plurality of values, of the conflict 
between different values that cannot all be realized... has been 
subordinated to the theme or hope of the harmonious reconciliation and 
realization of all values.... A person who tracks bestness, who seeks 
value, will have to formulate her own package of value realization; she 
cannot simply “maximize” on the value dimension. This package need not 
be an aggregate, it can pattern and unify the diverse values it realizes. In 
thus patterning value, the person may emulate a previous pattern 
exhibited by a value exemplar or described in some tradition, or she may 
create a new complex unity, sculpting the value contours of her life in an 
original, perhaps unique way... 
 
and Nozick, p. 507 ff: Harmonious Hierarchical Development. 
 
 Would conscience fail to demonstrate further growth, if progress is 
arrested in some domains --or if there fails to be a dialectical interaction among 
the domains? Does moral flourishing require complex integrations across 
conscience domains in such a way that no particular bedrock value is the 
greatest good but the concept of good lies in how realizing any value entails 
realizing the others? MacIntyre (p.157) makes some exceptions to Aristotle in 
what he otherwise characterizes as his Aristotelian ethics. Contrary to Aristotle 
(and Plato,too), he sees the possibility of conflict arising among the virtues. An 
example is a courageous soldier fighting for an unjust cause. 
 
16. The table provides the starting point for a psychological critique of each moral 
philosophy that lays exclusive claim to a most valuable of all values, a greatest 
good, a summum bonum. The crux of this critique is that there is not, on 
developmental psychological grounds, an Archimedean point from which 
leverage can be applied to elevate the bedrock value associated with any one 
domain to the status of summum bonum. Rather, each bedrock value has a claim 
on our moral reasoning and choosing. The table is accompanied by a supposition 
and a caveat. The supposition: while its unique appeal may be due to an 
emphasis upon a value associated with a single conscience domain, a moral 
philosophy endures and becomes great according to its resonance and 
compatibility  with values associated with every conscience domain. Nozick 
makes this very point in reference to two of them. Nozick, pp. 494-498: 
 
  There are two powerful and intuitively appealing molds  
  into which theorists have fitted or poured substantive ethics: 
  a deontological one and a teleological one.... 
   
Particularly interesting from the standpoint of conscience is Nozick’s idea (p.495) 
that deontology and teleology may relate to what he calls (p. 401) ethical pull 
(elaborated pp. 451-473) and ethical push (elaborated pp. 403-450), respectively. 
The idea of applying both teleological and deontological perspectives, inter alia, 
to ethical issues is discussed by Nozick, Williams, and, popularly, by Kidder. 
 
17. Coppleston, vol.1, p.433. Epictetus, among the later Stoics, advises the daily 
examination of conscience.  
 With regards to Medieval Christian Ethics, Haldane [see Haldane (1993): 
Medieval and renaissance ethics, In: A COMPANION TO ETHICS, pp. 133-146.] 
relates that St.Jerome (347-420) introduced the term  'synderesis' to refer to the 
innate power of distinguishing good from evil, referring to it as the spark of 
conscience, a similar intuitionist version of conscience is found in St. Augustine 
(354-430) whereas St. Aquinas, while allowing for synderesis regards conscience 
as equivalent to right reason. 
 Contrary to the view that conscience must be followed, advocated by 
Ockham in the Middle Ages, in 1651, Hobbes wrote in LEVIATHAN  (see: 
Hobbes, T. (1957) Leviathan. M. Oakeshott. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Part 1, chapter 1.) 
    
 Another doctrine repugnant to civil society is that whatsoever a man 
does against his conscience, is sin; and it dependeth on the presumption 
of making himself judge of good and evil. For a man’s conscience and his 
judgment are the same thing, and as the judgment, so also the conscience 
may be erroneous.... 
 
 With regards to modern philosophers, in Coppleston, vol. V, p.172ff., one 
finds reference to the Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713) who considered every 
man, to some degree at least, capable of perceiving moral values, of 
discriminating between vice and virtue. This he called moral sense, which he 
assimilated to the aesthetic faculty. Hutcheson (1694-1746) took up the subject 
of moral sense: 
 
By the moral sense ‘we perceive pleasure, in the contemplation of such 
(good) actions in others, and are determined to love the agent (and much 
more do we perceive pleasure in being conscious of having done the 
actions ourselves) without any view of further natural advantage from 
them... 
 
This brings us to Bishop Butler who, 
 
 In the Dissertation of the Nature of Virtue ...speaks of conscience as ‘this  
 moral approving and disapproving faculty  [which might be ] called   
 conscience , moral reason , moral sense, or divine reason; whether  
 considered as a sentiment of the understanding or as a  perception  of the  
 heart, or which seems the truth, as including both.’.... 
 
As subsequently described by Coppleston (pp. 318ff.), David Hume bases 
morality on passion as opposed to reason, he introduces p. 323) his idea of 
sympathy (which would today be called empathy) and defines virtue (p.331) ‘to 
be whatever mental action or quality gives to the spectator the pleasing 
sentiment of approbation; and vice the contrary.’ After Hume, in 1759, the 
Scottish economist, Adam Smith, entitled a work THEORY OF MORAL 
SENTIMENTS wherein sympathy is contradistinguished  from self-interested 
affection as an original  sentiment of human nature. It is also contradistinguished 
from moral sense (Coppleston, p.356): 
  
And there is no need to postulate a distinct ‘moral sense,’ which 
expresses itself in moral approval or disapproval. For ‘to approve of the 
passions of another, as suitable to their objects, is the same thing as to 
observe that we entirely sympathize with them ; and not to approve of 
them as such is the same thing as to observe that we  do not entirely 
sympathize with them’... 
 
Smith balances his emphasis on sentiment by allowing for the concept of 
spectator idealized as the impartial spectator (Coppleston, p.359): 
 
 ‘I divide myself, as it were, into two persons ...the first is the spectator...  
 the second is the agent... of whose conduct, under the character of a  
 spectator, I was endeavoring to form some opinion... 
 
In terms of conscience domains as we have described them, Smith seemingly 
collapsed the domains of moral emotional responsiveness and valuation, in effect 
reducing value to emotion (as others have attempted to reduce value to 
cognition) but preserved both conceptualization (in the form of spectatorship) and 
volition.  
 
Coppleston (p.361) points out that the moral sense school had psychologizing 
tendencies, which perhaps accounts for their pertinence, however partial, to our 
psychology of conscience.  
 
 The contemporary psychology of empathy owes much to the work of 
 Martin Hoffman, see references. 
 
For a more contemporary and popular treatment of the subject, see Wilson, J.Q.  
(1993): THE MORAL SENSE. The Free Press, New York. 
 
  Some other Western philosophers who dealt with the concept of 
conscience are Hegel who argued that both universal objective good and moral 
conscience, or subjective will, are abstract and belong to the intermediate sphere 
of Moralitat as opposed to higher ethical life, Sittlichkeit see Collins, J. (1967): 
THE MIND OF KIERKEGAARD, Henry Regnery & Co., Chicago. p.117, and  
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and Law [see Hegel, F. (1954) in THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL  (C. Friedrich, ed.) the Modern Library, New York. pp. 
251-260.  
 Since we have introduced the metaphor, conscience as bridge, it is 
instructive to read Hegel who described conscience as a moment in an ongoing 
dialectic to the Ethical. Conscience slips into the dialectic as Hegel describes 
three aspects of the right of moral will. These aspects are 
  a) the formal right of action such that the content of the action is mine and  
 represent the purpose of my subjective will. 
 b) the special character of the action , its inner content as it is for me 
{what we take to be intentionality--MG.}, and its content as the special aim 
of my individual well-being, 
 c) This inner content in its universality, as elevated into absolute, existing  
 objectivity, is the absolute aim of the will -that is, the Good. This is the  
 sphere of the reflection with the antithesis of subjective universality, partly  
 of evil, and partly of conscience... 
 
Conscience emerges again in the description of the transition from Morality to 
Ethics: 
 
 The Good is yet abstract. But, as the concrete substance of freedom, it  
 demands determinations or qualities in general, as well as the principle of  
 freedom, as identical with the Good Conscience, which is yet only an  
 abstract principle of determination, likewise demands that its  
 determinations be given universality and objectivity. We have seen how  
 both good and duty, when either of them is raised to independent  
 universality, lack the specific definite character that they ought to  
 have. But the integration of both the Good and Conscience as relatively  
 independent is potentially accomplished in their organic unity. For we have 
 seen subjectivity vanishing into its own emptiness, already posited (in the  
 form of pure self -certitude or conscience) as identical with the abstract  
 universality of the Good. This integration of the Good and Conscience is  
 the real truth of them both. It is their concrete organic unity. This unity is 
 the sphere of Ethics, or the concrete ethical world of social life.... 
 
Hegel often requires an interpretation to make his ideas clear.  These remarks on 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPIRIT by Mure, G. (1965): THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
HEGEL, London Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 168-169 may help: 
 
The subjective moral will, in so far as it is a unity, emerges as conscience, 
having for its ideal a universal goodness, the absolute final aim of the 
world of men and things. Conscience claims as a right and a duty  to have 
insight into this ideal good, to intend it, and to realize it in action; and this 
is its own goodness. But as inward, particular, and subjective, it cannot 
fulfill this duty nor justify its claim to sacrosanct autonomy. Not only may 
contingency frustrate its purpose, but its insight is fallible. It may deceive 
itself and give any false content to its intention.... it may intend only its own 
self-interest... 
 Hegel’s transition from morality to ethical life is obscure in detail but 
clear in outline. With the recognition that inner purity is impotent and wide 
open to perversion, the will moves outward ...to achieve a concrete 
objective freedom. This it does by bringing self-consciousness the 
unconscious forgotten basis of custom and convention, which is already in 
it, and recreating this and (so itself) in social and political institutions, the 
family, society, and the State. These it now recognizes for what they are, 
namely its only means to realize its abstractly subjective freedom and 
goodness by articulating and making good through them its vague ideal of 
good which ought to be, its only way to justify ...its premature claim as 
particular subjective conscience to autonomy of judgment and action.... 
 
17. MacIntyre, pp. 146-164. N.B.: MacIntyre’s project to revitalize Aristotelian 
Ethics requires a teleological account to substitute for Aristotle’s own 
metaphysical biology. Provisionally (pp. 219-220), he concludes that the good life 
is the life spent seeking the good life and the virtues necessary for the seeking 
are those which will enable us to understand what more and what else the good 
life is. Hence, for example, Aristotelian ethics has been characterized by 
MacIntyre in terms of a view that human beings have a certain nature which 
disposes them to certain aims and goals (telos), that virtues are those qualities 
the possession of which enable a person to achieve well-being (eudaimonia ) 
and the lack of which frustrate movement toward that telos, and that there are 
intellectual virtues and  virtues of character the pursuit of which entails using 
practical reason to achieve balance and striving towards a golden mean 
(sophrosyne). These activities occur within practices associated with roles that 
arise from traditions of the polis. Rough correspondences between domains of 
conscience and elements of an Aristotelian virtue based ethics include: 
 
 'phronesis' (practical wisdom)  CONCEPTUALIZATION 
 “ a true disposition towards Here understood as moral  
 moral judgment, part of judgment 
 action by the aid of a rule   
 with regard to things good  
 and bad.”   
 see Coppleston (1993),  
 volume I,p.343.        
                 
 'telos'          VALUATION 
  
 'eudaimonia'  MORAL EMOTIONAL   
   RESPONSIVENESS, 
    (especially “be good /feel   
    good” homeostasis)    
   
 'sophrosyne'  MORAL EMOTIONAL         
    RESPONSIVENESS 
 
 'polis'            MORAL ATTACHMENT,   
    AUTHORITY-DERIVED   
    VALUATION. 
 
19. Nozick, pp. 403-450. 
 
“Free will vs. determinism” is sometimes referred to as a metapsychological as 
well as a philosophical issue. The real or perceived problem has been to 
reconcile our sense of agency with a completely physicalistic account of the 
universe (I leave aside the issue of psychic determinism which figures historically 
in psychoanalytic theory). Hence, the issue might better be stated “ free will vs. 
physicalism (also called materialism)” irrespective of whether the physicalistic 
universe is deterministic or indeterministic / probabilistic. Our sense of agency 
does not stand alone as having problems being reconciled with a completely 
physicalistic account of the universe. All our inner states do. This is generally 
called the “mind--body problem,” and although Cartesian dualism has been 
discounted, a satisfying resolution of the problem has yet to be advanced in the 
context of physicalism. Sometimes the concept of “biological emergence” is 
suggested to account for our subjective experience of being inside, of having 
inner states. Radical (eliminative) materialists [see Rorty,R. (1971): In defense of 
eliminative materialism. In D. Rosenthal (ed.) MATERIALISM AND THE MIND 
BODY PROBLEM, Prentice-Hall] once proposed doing away altogether with 
mental state language. Others believe that the problem can be dissolved rather 
than resolved by paying close attention to our language and “ What we cannot 
speak about, we must pass over in silence,” as Wittgenstein of the Tractatus 
advises (Wittgenstein, L. translated by D.F. Pears & B.F. McGuiness (1974): 
TRACTATUS LOGICO PHILOSOPHICUS, Humanities Press, Great Britain, 
p.74). For many people there are difficulties with any of these approaches. 
Generally, on the issue “free will vs. determinism,” individuals who take positions 
describe those positions as 'libertarian' (free will exists and is not compatible with 
determinism- although it is difficult to say how the introduction of chance into the 
universe helps at all, since what is really wanted is uncaused but not capricious  
causality ), 'compatibilist' (free will exists and is compatible with determinism ), or 
free will does not exist in our universe whether or not our universe is 
deterministic. Of course, from the standpoint of moral developmental psychology 
(or perhaps any rational standpoint whatsoever), this issue cannot be settled. 
There are, however, empirical questions that can be:  
 “ Do people universally have a sense of agency?”,  
 “ If so, how do they conceptualize their sense of agency in the course of 
 development?”  
Children are not apt to spend much time in philosophical speculation. Still from 
the moral psychological point of view, an adult’s response to the free will/ 
determinism issue and mind/body problem may be useful projectively in 
understanding how s/he conceptualizes his/her conscience viz a viz chains of 
cause and effect beginning before that person was born. See reference list.  
     
20. To illustrate this we have chosen two early existentialists with two very 
different views on moral development: Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich 
Nietzsche. See references for suitable anthologies. 
 Søren Kierkegaard (or ‘S. K.’ to follow the customary abbreviation used by 
many of his interpreters and biographers), the Danish philosopher who has been 
called the father of existentialism, wrote his devotional works in his own name but 
adopted pseudonyms for his psychological and philosophical works. He indicates 
in his Journals that his intent in writing pseudonymously is to underscore that 
with each pseudonym, he is taking a certain point of view or perspective, offering 
both the advantages and disadvantages of a limited scope. So long as his 
readers recognize the limitations they will not be deceived into thinking that a 
particular pseudonym represents S.K.’s final point of view, which he says is to be 
found in his devotional works. S.K.’s project is not unlike shifting from the 
perspective of psychology on morality and religion to a theological perspective on 
psychology.   
  In one pseudonymous work entitled EITHER / OR S.K. first contrasts the 
aesthetic and the moral views of life. In another book entitled STAGES ON 
LIFE’S WAY S.K. identifies an aesthetic stage, a moral stage and a religious 
stage. For each stage he identifies an exemplar: Don Juan, Socrates and 
Abraham, respectively. The moral stage S.K. depicts is fairly consonant with 
Kant’s ethics, the idea of the categorical imperative (Kant’s version of the Golden 
Rule states that a person should always will his actions in such a way that he 
would accept them as universally applicable). It is in one of his psychological 
works entitled Fear and Trembling that S.K. does the amazing thing of showing 
religious faith in conflict with conscience. He does this by visiting and revisiting 
the story of Abraham and Isaac on Mount Moria. Loving father and beloved son 
are instructed by God to ready themselves for a sacrifice. Only Abraham knows 
that God has further instructed him that his son will be the one sacrificed. S.K. is 
so impressed by Abraham’s suffering in the face of this dilemma created by a 
conflict not only with his love for Isaac but also with the moral duty to others 
(“Thou shalt not kill”) he coins the phrase “religious horror” to describe the 
experience. He also describes Abraham as being subject to a teleological (i.e. 
the end justifies the means) suspension of the ethical. The Abraham-Isaac motif 
is a powerful example of potential conflict between religious and moral values. 
S.K.’s use of this motif serves to distinguish moral mandates from religious ones, 
although he did not mean to imply that in ordinary circumstances the two were in 
conflict. On the contrary, he would have agreed with the notion that grace builds 
upon nature, that just as the moral domains of personal development do not 
absolutely negate the aesthetic domains, the religious domains of personal 
development may transform but do not absolutely negate the moral domains.   
Unless someone’s psychotically delusional, we may be inclined to reassure 
ourselves, he or she is not going to attribute to God such a suspension of the 
ethical. Then we think of zealotry and we think of terrorism and we think of 
racism and we think even of religious intolerance and we appreciate our own 
modern day religious horrors.  God’s compassion for Abraham’s suffering is 
manifest in the appearance of an angel who stays Abraham’s hand before he 
strikes a lethal blow at his son. While there is evidently a shortage of angels in 
our time, perhaps there is nonetheless a message in the Abraham-Isaac story 
that God does not usually intend double binds generated by religious 
development on the one hand and moral development on the other. Indeed an 
alternative exegesis of the story of Abraham and Isaac might explore the implied 
message that God’s good, while not always clear to us, is generally consonant 
with our moral sense, and that God makes no exemption for God in expecting 
goodness.  
 Nietzsche was also a moral philosopher who long ago provided a 
polemical critique of human moralities. One can almost hear him launch into a 
tirade disparaging ordinary conscience functions (at least as pertains to pro-
social development) as following “the herd instinct”. And yet he also saw   some 
human beings as forever fated to be value-makers and choosers, ultimately 
exhorting them to revaluate all values, and above all flourish creatively. 
Nietzsche’s philosophy begins with the proposition that God is dead, raising the 
specter of nihilism, the absence of an ultimate ground for values--not in religion 
and not in metaphysics. And yet the best human beings, the forerunners of the 
Ubermensch (the Overman), are able to sublimate the will to power that drives 
life, in embracing their fate (amor fati), in artistic creativity beyond good and evil, 
the very possibility of which is sufficient to merit an affirmation of the eternal 
recurrence of the same, a doctrine capable of producing nausea in all others. A 
consideration of Nietzsche’s work raises the issue whether there are ways to 
liberate morality from (as opposed to amoralizing) the domains of conscience 
while preserving some (namely its autonomous) functionality. MacIntyre, p. 113-
114: 
 
For it was Nietzsche’s historic achievement to understand more clearly 
than any other philosopher---certainly more clearly than his counterparts in 
Anglo-Saxon emotivism and continental existentialism --not only that what 
purported to be appeals to objectivity were in fact expressions of 
subjective will, but also the nature of the problems that this posed for 
moral philosophy... 
          In a famous passage in The Gay Science  (section 335) Nietzsche 
jeers at the notion of basing morality on inner moral sentiments, on 
conscience, on the one hand, or on the Kantian categorical imperative, on 
universalizability, on the other.... The underlying structure of his argument 
is as follows: if there is nothing to morality but expressions of will, my 
morality can only be what my will creates. There can be no place for such 
fictions as natural rights, utility, the greatest good for the greatest number. 
I myself must bring into existence ‘new tables of what is good.’ 
 
MacIntyre considers contemporary moral philosophy to be presented with a 
choice between essentially Nietzschean and Aristotelian premises, p. 114:   
  
 Whenever those immersed in the bureaucratic culture of the age try to  
 think their way through to the moral foundations of what they are and do, 
 they will discover suppressed Nietzschean premises.... 
 
What appears to be (to some) the spectre of Nietzsche is, interestingly, a 
concern of Pellegrino, in the context of medical ethics. See Pellegrino, E.D. 
(1993) : The metamorphosis of medical ethics, a 30 year retrospective. JAMA, 
269, 1158-1162: 
 
Elaboration of a new underpinning for medical ethics will be greatly 
complicated by the parlous state of contemporary philosophy and ethics 
and the strong current of nihilism and skepticism in both fields. In 
philosophy for example, [R.] Rorty denies the possibility of arriving at any 
truths through philosophy and the relevance of any theory of reality. 
Derrida likewise denies that there is any truth, only the appearance of truth 
and words to which we impute whatever meaning they may have for us. 
[Bernard] Williams takes the same skeptical view of ethics and moral 
accountability. These writers demolish philosophy, theology, and ethics 
simultaneously, in full capitulation to the Nietzschean legacy. For 
Nietzsche, the idea of one truth was an illusion: all we are capable of 
discussing are multiple truths seen from many incommensurable 
perspectives.... 
 
While Pellegrino correctly identifies perspectivalism and rejection of rationalism 
as elements of Nietzsche’s philosophy, it is not clear that Nietzsche was, himself, 
at all relativistic. He had, after all, definite opinions about ‘slave morality’, 
rejecting it on behalf of the Ubermenschen, who were called to creatively 
overcome nihilism in self-affirmation in the face of all that is and was (eternal 
recurrence). Relativism implies a certain amount of tolerance, notably lacking in 
Nietzsche. Williams, whom Pellegrino mentions in the above passage, notes in 
his discussion of relativism (pp. 158-159): 
 
...[I]t is implausible that ethical conceptions of right and wrong have a 
logically inherent relativity to a given society.... [S]uppose [a hypothetical 
hypertraditional society] does have some rules expressed in terms of 
something like “right” and “wrong.” When it is first exposed to another 
culture and invited to reflect, it cannot suddenly discover that there is an 
implicit relativization hidden in its language. It will always be too early or 
too late for that. It is too early when they have never reflected or thought of 
an alternative to “us.” ...It is too late when they confront the new situation; 
that requires them to see beyond their existing rules and practices. It now 
looks as if relativism may be excluded altogether. The fact that people can 
and must react when they are confronted by another culture, and do so by 
existing notions -also by reflecting upon them -seems to show that the 
ethical thought of a given culture can always stretch beyond its 
boundaries. It is important that this is a point about the content or 
aspirations of ethical thought, not about its objectivity. Even if there is no 
way in which divergent ethical beliefs can be brought to converge by 
independent inquiry or rational argument, this fact will not imply 
relativism.... 
 Nevertheless, while it is true that non-objectivity does not imply any 
relativistic attitude, there does seem something blank and unresponsive in 
merely stopping at that truth. If you are conscious of non-objectivity, 
should that not properly affect the way in which you see the application or 
extent of your ethical outlook? If so, how? This consciousness cannot just 
switch off your ethical reactions when you are confronted with another 
group, and there is no reason why it should. Some people have thought it 
should, believing that a proper relativistic view requires you to be equally 
well disposed to everyone else’s ethical beliefs. This is seriously confused, 
since it takes relativism to issue into a non-relativistic morality of universal 
toleration. But the confused reaction is certainly a reaction to something. If 
we become conscious of ethical variation and of the kinds of explanation it 
may receive, it is incredible that this consciousness should leave 
everything where it was and not affect our ethical thought itself. We can go 
on, no doubt, simply saying that we are right and everyone else is 
wrong...but if we have arrived at this stage of reflection, it seems a 
remarkably inadequate response. What else is possible? ...We should ask 
how much room we can coherently find for thinking like this, and how far it 
provides a more adequate response to reflection.... 
    
This does not seem to be a particularly destructive point of view. In fact it is a 
view that one could characterize as embodying the Piagetian processes of 
assimilation and accommodation. Conscience contours are shaped by new 
ethical experiences, reflected upon by the person. There will be efforts to 
assimilate what can be assimilated, and sometimes to accommodate, shaping 
new contours. There will also be resistance mounted to efforts to reshape some 
contours, considered to make an important difference. The view is as much 
developmental as it is relativistic. It is also noteworthy, and lends credence to 
what Williams is stating, that the previously discussed cross-cultural study of 
Shweder et al. (1987) included questions that tapped into the issue of relativism 
in the form of what was acknowledged to be conventional vs. context-dependent 
moral thinking (p. 59): 
 
A more abstract formulation of that context dependent moral argument 
[given in a minority position among Brahmins] goes something as follows. 
America is a young civilization. India is an ancient civilization. It takes a 
long time for a civilization to figure out and evolve good or proper practices 
and institutions, those that are in equilibrium with the requirements of 
nature. You should not expect the young to possess the wisdom of the 
old. America is doing what is fitting or normal for its early stage of 
development. Its practices are not arbitrary....  
 
Returning To Williams (p. 160):  
 
If we are to accommodate the relativists concerns, we must not simply 
draw a line between ourselves and others. We must not draw a line at all, 
but recognize that others are at varying distances from us. We must also 
see that our reactions and relations to other groups are themselves part of 
our ethical life, and we should understand these reactions more 
realistically in terms of the practices and sentiments that help shape our 
life. Some divergences and disagreements matter more than others. 
Above all, it matters whether the contrast of our outlook with another is 
one that makes a difference, whether a question has to be resolved about 
what life is going to be lived by one group or the other... 
 
In spite of his polemical comments regarding Williams, Pellegrino (p.1162) 
seems to agree with Williams regarding cross-cultural medical ethics: 
 
Such radical relativism is reinforced by the worldwide surge of cultural 
hegemony in morality. In this view the medical ethic that has supplanted 
the Hippocratic ethic is a Western product and incompatible on various 
grounds with other cultures, particularly regarding autonomy. As the 
Western version of ethics comes into contact with other cultures, we can 
expect sharply defined points of conflict and agreement. Yet medical 
ethics holds more hope for a better grounding of principles, rules, virtues, 
and moral psychology than any other field of ethics....    
 
21. MacIntyre, p.191. 
 The first stage definition of virtue is refined in two other stages, which 
require unity of life and a concept of tradition. (Ibid, pp. 204 ff.) This is most 
succinctly stated in the Postscript to the Second Edition  (p. 273): 
 
My account of virtues proceeds through three stages: a first which 
concerns them as qualities necessary to achieve the goods internal to 
practices; a second which considers them as qualities contributing to the 
good of a whole life; and a third which relates them to the pursuit of a 
good for human beings the conception of which can only be elaborated 
and possessed within an ongoing social tradition. 
 
22. Ibid, p.187. 
 
23. Ibid, p.190. 
 
24. Ibid, pp. 190-191. 
 25. Ibid, pp. 218-219. 
 Narrative history is essential to the account of virtues as well: 
 
A central thesis then begins to emerge: man is in his actions and practice, 
as well as in his fictions, essentially a story telling animal. He is not 
essentially, but becomes through his history, a teller of stories that aspire 
to truth. But the key question for men is not about their own authorship; I 
can only answer the question ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior 
question ‘ Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?’ We enter 
human society, that is, with one or more imputed characters--roles into 
which we have been drafted--and we learn what they are in order to be 
able to understand how others respond to us and how our responses to 
them are apt to be construed. It is through hearing stories about wicked 
stepmothers, good but misguided kings, wolves that suckle twin boys, 
youngest sons who receive no inheritance but must make their own way in 
the world and eldest sons who waste their inheritance on riotous living and 
go into exile to live with the swine, that children learn or mis-learn both 
what a child and what a parent is, what the cast of characters may be in 
the drama into which they have been born and what the ways of the world 
are.... 
 
26. There may be means by which the organic unity of conceptualization, 
attachment, emotions, valuation and volition can develop independently of 
conscience - that is, amorally- for example, via bridges that are associated with 
an aesthetic sense or, perhaps, a kind of undifferentiated valuation driven by the 
will to power (what Nietzsche had in mind). The repudiation of conscience, while 
a repudiation of part of human nature, is nonetheless possible to humans. One 
may choose to reject conscience. Amoralized or demoralized domains of 
conscience can still be (dys)functional.  For example, as Nozick mentions, 
sadistic enjoyment of another’s suffering may require an exquisite sensitivity to 
feelings comparable to empathic responsiveness but uncoupled from good will. 
Nor do we believe that a conscience-centered ethics can be summarized as “Let 
your conscience be your guide.”  Of course we must let our consciences guide 
us---but we must also guide, and accept guidance for, our consciences. Because 
also possible are conscience malformations (speaking in structural terms) or 
distortions (speaking in functional terms), in which, the contours of conscience 
have been principally or substantially shaped by racial, gender or other 
prejudices or have been disguised by individual egoism or institutional 
survivalism. Some of our work has been with children, maltreated early in life, in 
whom conscience functions, it is true, but functions amidst developmental delays 
and psychopathological interferences. At the extreme, dissociation of the links 
between the conscience domains, what has been termed demoralization, leaves 
a person unable to maintain the organic unity of conscience conceptually, subject 
to meaningless reverberations of moral emotions, unable to seek, keep or make 
values and subject to paralysis in the face of having to make choices. 
Bidirectional causality must be understood in this way: the inherited vulnerability 
to and/or the transduction of stress or trauma into depression (or chronic PTSD) 
operates at a neurobiological level that delays conscience development and 
subverts conscience functioning. In particular, depression is a disorder of mood 
but certainly as much if not more, one of valuation and volition. We claim there is 
a psychobiology of conscience to be advanced. To make this claim is to reject a 
completely reductionistic approach to science. We stand at a post skeptical 
rationalist station of inquiry, as described by Overton and Horowitz (see endnote 
#8): “order is brought into the manifest world by constructing abstract, normative 
patterns that plausibly , intelligibly and coherently systematize the domain of 
inquiry.  These patterns originate in abductive or retroductive inference 
processes, which originate in metaphor and metatheoretical assumptions. Causal 
laws, or general antecedent-consequent functional relations become formulated 
within , and derive their meaning from, the pattern context. Testing proceeds 
according to criteria including scope of application, depth, logical consistency, 
fruitfulness, viability and empirical support.”  Hence there is a role for empirically 
testing hypotheses in a reductionistic framework. Our group had, for example, an 
a priori hypothesis that serum dopamine hydroxylase activity would be lower in 
boys who had lower scores in the conscience domain of valuation.  
 
 27. From the outset a person is engaged in wonder. Wonder was recognized by 
the Greeks as the beginning of philosophy. Heidegger understood our need to be 
reminded of it. Engagement in wonder, as it is moralized, as it unfolds morally is 
the beginning of the moral adventure, which just may be an equivalent term for 
conscience in its formation and its practiced use. The connection between 
conscience and human Being (Dasein ) was emphasized by Heidegger this way:  
 
Conscience gives us “something” to understand; it discloses... It is 
revealed as a call. Calling is a mode of discourse. The call of conscience 
has the character of an appeal to Dasein by calling it to its own most 
potentiality- for -Being--its--Self... (see W.T. Jones volume V, pp.316-17 
for additional commentary). 
 
A person is engaged in wonder in different ways as developments permit, 
according to processes that become recognizably thoughtful, emotional, 
relational, valuational and volitional. Thoughtful engagement may be seen as 
interest. Emotional engagement may be seen as care. Valuational engagement 
may be seen as approval or affirmation. Volitional engagement may be seen as 
concern, by which is meant a call to choose. 
     
28.  Research that has been done in this area pertains to moral reasoning among 
professionals. See: Self D. & Baldwin, D. (1994): Moral reasoning in medicine. In: 
J. Rest & D Narvaez (ed.): MORAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE PROFESSIONS, 
Lawrence Erlbaum and Associates, Hillsdale, N.J. pp. 147-162. The authors 
identify two waves of studies in medical students. The first was 1977-1985 and 
the second 1985--present. Studies of moral reasoning have primarily featured 
instruments derived from Kohlberg’s cognitive developmental moral theory:  
  
 Rest’s Defining Issues Test (DIT) 
 Kohlberg’s Moral Judgment Interview (MJI) 
 Gibbs’ Sociomoral Reflection Measure (SRM) 
 
One interesting finding by Sheehan’s group (1980, see Self & Baldwin’s 
references) in “the first wave”, cited in this review was that“ a high level of moral 
reasoning virtually excludes the possibility of being a poor performer and 
conversely that a low level of moral reasoning virtually excludes the possibility of 
performing well.” 
 In “the second wave”, Self et al. (1989, 1992, 1993 see Self & Baldwin’s 
references) conducted longitudinal studies on the possible effects of medical 
education on moral development and concluded that there was a “lack of 
increase in moral reasoning and development generally expected in this age 
group, suggesting a possible inhibiting effect of this educational experience.” 
They also introduced the empirical assessment of moral reasoning in the 
evaluation of teaching medical ethics. They found an increase in moral reasoning 
level in students exposed to the medical ethics course regardless of format 
(either lecture or case study discussion). Another interesting finding by Baldwin 
et al. (1991, cited in the review): there have been consistently higher moral 
reasoning scores in women than in men in every year of medical school. Self and 
Baldwin write: 
 
Many of the research studies...indicated consistently higher levels of moral 
reasoning for men than for women, calling into question the highly 
publicized contention of Gilligan...and others that women generally score 
lower on Kohlberg’s moral dilemmas because of their different moral 
orientation. Since the use of the DIT in this study did not appear to work to 
the disadvantage of the women subjects, it would seem that the DIT and 
other Kohlberg measures of moral development can be appropriately 
used...   
 However, despite this finding, 
 
...considerable interest remains in further exploring the dimension of the 
orientation of caring as proposed by Gilligan (1982) and Noddings (1984) 
and others. Self and Skeel (1992) developed an interview instrument for 
assessment of moral reasoning and moral orientation in a single interview 
(MROI).  
 
The MROI was used to assess the influence of philosophical vs. theological 
education on the moral development of clinical medical ethicists. They were not 
significantly different in their moral reasoning skills, nor in their moral orientations 
toward justice or care (defined as recognition, predominance and alignment with 
the relevant concepts). No significant relationship was found between age or 
gender and moral reasoning or orientation. In comparing these clinical ethicists to 
practicing physicians, the physicians scored lower in moral reasoning, but were 
not found to be different in moral orientation compared to the clinical ethicists. 
Among physicians, however, older ones scored higher in moral reasoning and 
women were more likely than men to recognize elements of care in moral 
dilemmas, men more likely to recognize justice. 
 
Looking specifically at moral orientation in medical students with the Gilligan Real 
Life Conflict and Choice Interview (Brown et al., 1988 cited in review) Self et al. 
(1993 cited in review) found the moral orientation of 20 medical students to be as 
follows:  
 
  recognition of justice issues in 95% of the moral conflicts;  
  care in 90%  
  predominance of justice  as the organizing resolution principle in  
  30% of responses; care  in 55% 
  alignment with justice  as the preferred mode of resolution -20%;  
  care in 25%  
  only 15%  of the medical students demonstrated a balanced 
  approach where neither care nor justice predominated.  
  Gender difference as predicted by Gilligan’s claim justice 
  orientation 66.7% in males 33.3% in females; care orientation 
  72.7% in females 27.3% in males. 
 They conclude that  
  there may be other moral aspects besides justice and care that  
  form the structure of moral reasoning in medical students  …Other  
  possible  moral ideals need to be explored , including those of  
  benevolence, following authority , and adherence  to religious 
  teachings. 
  
 It seems likely that the HEALTH PROFESSIONAL CONSCIENCE 
INTERVIEW (Galvin, in development), an adaptation of the  semi-structured SCI, 
may provide an excellent means to explore this matter further since it is sensitive 
to 5  conscience domains and associated intrinsic (bedrock) values and is not 
constrained by the bipolar analysis for  justice and care.       
 The question regarding how our professions’ teachers can help shape 
conscience contours has its counterpart in the recent literature on education of, 
for example, nurses and psychiatric residents in ethics. See: Duckett, L. & 
Ryden, M. (1994) Education for ethical nursing practice. In Rest and Navaez: 
pp.51-69: 
 The authors report on their multi -course sequential learning approach   
 (MCSL), which weaves in an identifiable strand of content throughout the  
 curriculum in a vertical course with units embedded in existing courses 
 across various levels of a program. Ethics in nursing can be viewed as the
 intersection of three overlapping disciplines: nursing, philosophy (seen as
 prescriptive especially of tolerance) and moral psychology (seen as 
 descriptive). The authors advocate an integrative theory of nursing ethics 
 that synthesizes caring and justice and have utilized Rest’s four- 
 component model of moral action: moral sensitivity, moral  
 reasoning, moral commitment or motivation, moral character, but add 
 implementing the moral decision. They report gains on DIT scores and a 
 positive correlation between clinical performance and moral reasoning. 
 
See:  Roberts L. & McCarty T. (eds.) (1996):  Special Theme:  Education of 
Psychiatry Residents in Ethics. ACADEMIC PSYCHIATRY 20, 3. Entire issue.  
 
N.B.  The method we advocate for further consideration couples education 
regarding the general nature of conscience development with reflection upon and 
description of the unique contours of one’s individual conscience as a 
professional person. This method complements existing ways of supporting 
ethical fitness.      
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PART TWO 
{to be transcribed} 
 
    [Consultation from Drs. Stilwell, Kline & Bowman: Dr. Every Person ] 
 
ABSTRACT FOR PANEL DISCUSSION  
 
 The panel will consist of Barbara Stilwell, M. D. , moderator, Elizabeth 
Bowman, M.D. and Mark Kline, M.D., discussants. The panelists will have had an 
opportunity to familiarize themselves with the essential text of the presentation 
made in the preceding hour by Dr. Matthew R. Galvin, including the Case 
Vignette. In addition they will have been provided a copy of the Health 
Professional Student Conscience Interview, in its most current draft form, as well 
as a copy of the handout provided to the Grand Rounds participant-attendees 
(comprised of an annotated bibliography, a description of the conscience 
domains in children and adolescents, and the table, reconstructed in the 
preceding hour, showing conscience domains, associated intrinsic values, virtues 
and corresponding moral philosophical traditions). Each panelist will have 
complete freedom to offer her/his critique of our Conscience Theory as 
interpreted and presented by Dr. Galvin. Each panelist will have an opportunity to 
stimulate and engage in discussion regarding what each views as important 
crises in the professional conscience of Dr. Every Person, the fictitious mental 
health professional in the case vignette, or other aspects of the development of 
professional conscience not captured by the vignette.  However, principally, the 
panelists will engage themselves (and allow themselves to be engaged by the 
other Grand Rounds participant-attendees) in looking at the developmental 
process that psychiatry residents, psychology interns, psychiatric social work, 
nursing and other mental health professional students go through in seeking and 
accepting guidance while also moving towards fuller autonomy in forming their 
professional consciences. Implications of understanding the nature of conscience 
for medical/ mental health professional ethics will be considered.  
